Related papers: On Godel's "Much Weaker" Assumption
Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem is generalized to definable theories, which are not necessarily recursively enumerable, by using a couple of syntactic-semantic notions, one is the consistency of a theory with the set of all true…
This proof of Godel's first incompleteness theorem doesn't require omega-consistency, nor does it refer to codes of negated sentences as in Rosser's. It begins from where Godel's usual proof ends, and stalks it till it ends proving it.
We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some…
There is a longstanding debate in the logico-philosophical community as to why the G\"odelian sentences of a consistent and sufficiently strong theory are true. The prevalent argument seems to be something like this: since every one of the…
In an earlier paper, "Omega-inconsistency in Goedel's formal system: a constructive proof of the Entscheidungsproblem" (math/0206302), I argued that a constructive interpretation of Goedel's reasoning establishes any formal system of…
In this article we discuss the proof in the short unpublished paper appeared in the 3rd volume of Godel's Collected Works entitled "On undecidable sentences" (*1931?), which provides an introduction to Godel's 1931 ideas regarding the…
We demonstrate that, in itself and in the absence of extra premises, the following argument scheme is fallacious: The sentence A says about itself that it has a certain property F, and A does in fact have the property F; therefore A is…
A rather easy yet rigorous proof of a version of G\"odel's first incompleteness theorem is presented. The version is "each recursively enumerable theory of natural numbers with 0, 1, +, *, =, logical and, logical not, and the universal…
We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable consistency intended to reflect the actual consistency property of human beings. Then we give a generalization of the first and second G\"odel incompleteness theorem to stably…
We take an argument of G\"odel's from his ground-breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: the sentence $G$ says about itself that it is not provable, and $G$ is indeed not provable;…
The prevalent interpretation of G\"odel's Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory does not prove its consistency. It is however not entirely clear how to justify this informal reading, as the formulation of…
Inconsistency Robustness is performance of information systems with pervasively inconsistent information. Inconsistency Robustness of the community of professional mathematicians is their performance repeatedly repairing contradictions over…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…
In the paper we introduce a weak set theory $\mathsf{H}_{<\omega}$ . A formalization of arithmetic on finite von Neumann ordinals gives an embedding of arithmetical language into this theory. We show that $\mathsf{H}_{<\omega}$ proves a…
It is proved that if $T$ is a $\Sigma_{n+1}$ Definable theory which is $\Sigma_n$-sound and extends $PA$, then $T$ can not prove the sentence $\Sigma_n-sound(T)$ that expresses the $\Sigma_n$-soundness of $T$. Optimality of this result is…
This paper continues the author's previous study \cite{Kura20}, showing that several weak principles inspired by non-normal modal logic suffice to derive various refined forms of the second incompleteness theorem. Among the main results of…
A detailed and rigorous analysis of G\"odel's proof of his first incompleteness theorem is presented. The purpose of this analysis is two-fold. The first is to reveal what G\"odel actually proved to provide a clear and solid foundation upon…
We present an analogue of G\"{o}del's second incompleteness theorem for systems of second-order arithmetic. Whereas G\"{o}del showed that sufficiently strong theories that are $\Pi^0_1$-sound and $\Sigma^0_1$-definable do not prove their…
G\"odel's argument for the First Incompleteness Theorem is, structurally, a proof by contradiction. This article intends to reframe the argument by, first, isolating an additional assumption the argument relies on, and then, second, arguing…
In this paper we prove Chaitin's ``heuristic principle'', {\it the theorems of a finitely-specified theory cannot be significantly more complex than the theory itself}, for an appropriate measure of complexity. We show that the measure is…