Related papers: Markovian Persuasion with Two States
We consider consensus of multi-agent systems as a dual problem to Markov processes. Based on an exchange of relevant notions and results between the two fields, we present a uniform framework which admits the introduction and treatment of…
We consider discrete-time Markov decision processes in which the decision maker is interested in long but finite horizons. First we consider reachability objective: the decision maker's goal is to reach a specific target state with the…
In this paper, we consider an adversarial scenario where one agent seeks to achieve an objective and its adversary seeks to learn the agent's intentions and prevent the agent from achieving its objective. The agent has an incentive to try…
This paper introduces a Markov chain approach that allows a rigorous analysis of agent based opinion dynamics as well as other related agent based models (ABM). By viewing the ABM dynamics as a micro description of the process, we show how…
We propose a stochastic model of opinion exchange in networks. A finite set of agents is organized in a fixed network structure. There is a binary state of the world and each agent receives a private signal on the state. We model beliefs as…
We study the problem of optimizing the decisions of a preemptively capable transmitter to minimize the Age of Incorrect Information (AoII) when the communication channel has a random delay. We consider a slotted-time system where a…
In this paper, we model a decision-making process involving a set of interacting agents. We use Markovian opinion dynamics, where each agent switches between decisions according to a continuous time Markov chain. Existing opinion dynamics…
The problem of selecting the right state-representation in a reinforcement learning problem is considered. Several models (functions mapping past observations to a finite set) of the observations are given, and it is known that for at least…
Here we consider the communications tactics appropriate for a group of agents that need to "swarm" together in a highly adversarial environment. Specfically, whilst they need to cooperate by exchanging information with each other about…
The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data providing agencies sell user information to advertisers to allow…
Reinforcement learning algorithms are typically designed for generic Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), where any state-action pair can lead to an arbitrary transition distribution. In many practical systems, however, only a subset of the…
In this article we study the allocation of a budget to promote an opinion in a group of agents. We assume that their opinion dynamics are based on the well-known voter model. We are interested in finding the most efficient use of a budget…
Prominent opinion formation models such as the one by Friedkin and Johnsen (FJ) concentrate on the effects of peer pressure on public opinions. In practice, opinion formation is also based on information about the state of the world and…
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…
We study a persuasion problem in which a sender designs an information structure to induce a non-Bayesian receiver to take a particular action. The receiver, who is privately informed about his preferences, is a wishful thinker: he is…
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. Roughly, revision treats a surprising observation…
Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante…
We consider a two-player dynamic information design problem between a principal and a receiver -- a game is played between the two agents on top of a Markovian system controlled by the receiver's actions, where the principal obtains and…
In persuasion problems where the receiver's action is one-dimensional and his utility is single-peaked, optimal signals are characterized by duality, based on a first-order approach to the receiver's problem. A signal is optimal iff the…
A community of agents is subject to a stream of messages, which are represented as points on a plane of issues. Messages are sent by media and by agents themselves. Messages from media shape the public opinion. They are unbiased, i.e.…