Related papers: Learning in Games with Quantized Payoff Observatio…
In this paper, we investigate how randomness and uncertainty influence learning in games. Specifically, we examine a perturbed variant of the dynamics of "follow-the-regularized-leader" (FTRL), where the players' payoff observations and…
Follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) algorithms have become popular in the context of games, providing easy-to-implement methods for each agent, as well as theoretical guarantees that the strategies of all agents will converge to some…
In this paper, we introduce a class of learning dynamics for general quantum games, that we call "follow the quantum regularized leader" (FTQL), in reference to the classical "follow the regularized leader" (FTRL) template for learning in…
We investigate how perturbation does and does not improve the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithm in solving imperfect-information extensive-form games under sampling, where payoffs are estimated from sampled trajectories. While…
Follow the regularized leader FTRL is the premier algorithm for online optimization. However, despite decades of research on its convergence in constrained optimization -- and potential games in particular -- its behavior remained hitherto…
We investigate the accuracy of prediction in deterministic learning dynamics of zero-sum games with random initializations, specifically focusing on observer uncertainty and its relationship to the evolution of covariances. Zero-sum games…
In this study, we consider a variant of the Follow the Regularized Leader (FTRL) dynamics in two-player zero-sum games. FTRL is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium when time-averaging the strategies, while a lot of variants suffer…
Understanding the behavior of no-regret dynamics in general $N$-player games is a fundamental question in online learning and game theory. A folk result in the field states that, in finite games, the empirical frequency of play under…
In this paper, we examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. For concreteness, we focus on the archetypal follow the regularized leader (FTRL) family of algorithms, and we consider…
This study raises and addresses the problem of time-delayed feedback in learning in games. Because learning in games assumes that multiple agents independently learn their strategies, a discrepancy in optimization often emerges among the…
Strong reasoning capabilities can now be achieved by large-scale reinforcement learning (RL) without any supervised fine-tuning. Although post-training quantization (PTQ) and quantization-aware training (QAT) are well studied in the context…
The effect of entanglement and correlated noise in a four-player quantum Minority game is investigated. Different time correlated quantum memory channels are considered to analyze the Nash equilibrium payoff of the 1st player. It is seen…
The long-run behavior of multi-agent learning - and, in particular, no-regret learning - is relatively well-understood in potential games, where players have aligned interests. By contrast, in harmonic games - the strategic counterpart of…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
We study the emergence of chaotic behavior of Follow-the-Regularized Leader (FoReL) dynamics in games. We focus on the effects of increasing the population size or the scale of costs in congestion games, and generalize recent results on…
Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) is known as an effective and versatile approach in online learning, where appropriate choice of the learning rate is crucial for smaller regret. To this end, we formulate the problem of adjusting FTRL's…
Transformer-based models have made remarkable advancements in various NLP areas. Nevertheless, these models often exhibit vulnerabilities when confronted with adversarial attacks. In this paper, we explore the effect of quantization on the…
We introduce Cautious Optimism, a framework for substantially faster regularized learning in general games. Cautious Optimism, as a variant of Optimism, adaptively controls the learning pace in a dynamic, non-monotone manner to accelerate…
We study reinforcement learning (RL) for learning a Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium (QSE) in an episodic Markov game with a leader-follower structure. In specific, at the outset of the game, the leader announces her policy to the follower…
We derive a new analysis of Follow The Regularized Leader (FTRL) for online learning with delayed bandit feedback. By separating the cost of delayed feedback from that of bandit feedback, our analysis allows us to obtain new results in…