Related papers: Solving the Maximum Popular Matching Problem with …
We consider an extension of the {\em popular matching} problem in this paper. The input to the popular matching problem is a bipartite graph G = (A U B,E), where A is a set of people, B is a set of items, and each person a belonging to A…
We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G=(A U B, E), where each vertex in A U B specifies a strict…
Two-sided popular matchings in bipartite graphs are a well-known generalization of stable matchings in the marriage setting, and they are especially relevant when preference lists are incomplete. In this case, the cardinality of a stable…
The problem of covering the ground set of two matroids by a minimum number of common independent sets is notoriously hard even in very restricted settings, i.e.\ when the goal is to decide if two common independent sets suffice or not.…
In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the stable matching problem. In particular, we consider the setting where preferences may contain ties. For this generalization, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem…
We consider a problem of optimizing convex functionals over matroid bases. It is richly expressive and captures certain quadratic assignment and clustering problems. While generally NP-hard, we show it is polynomial time solvable when a…
We consider popular matching problems in both bipartite and non-bipartite graphs with strict preference lists. It is known that every stable matching is a min-size popular matching. A subclass of max-size popular matchings called dominant…
We study popular matchings in three classical settings: the house allocation problem, the marriage problem, and the roommates problem. In the popular matching problem, (a subset of) the vertices in a graph have preference orderings over…
The input of the popular roommates problem consists of a graph $G = (V, E)$ and for each vertex $v\in V$, strict preferences over the neighbors of $v$. Matching $M$ is more popular than $M'$ if the number of vertices preferring $M$ to $M'$…
In the stable marriage and roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a strictly ordered preference list over some or all of the other agents. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs of mutually accepted agents. If any…
In the popular edge problem, the input is a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B,E)$ where $A$ and $B$ denote a set of men and a set of women respectively, and each vertex in $A\cup B$ has a strict preference ordering over its neighbours. A…
Our input is a complete graph $G = (V,E)$ on $n$ vertices where each vertex has a strict ranking of all other vertices in $G$. Our goal is to construct a matching in $G$ that is popular. A matching $M$ is popular if $M$ does not lose a…
For a set A of n applicants and a set I of m items, we consider a problem of computing a matching of applicants to items, i.e., a function M mapping A to I; here we assume that each applicant $x \in A$ provides a preference list on items in…
A recently introduced restricted variant of the multidimensional stable roommate problem is the roommate diversity problem: each agent belongs to one of two types (e.g., red and blue), and the agents' preferences over the coalitions solely…
We are given a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$ where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every $a \in A$ ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference lists of $b \in B$…
Submodular maximization over a matroid constraint is a fundamental problem with various applications in machine learning. Some of these applications involve decision-making over datapoints with sensitive attributes such as gender or race.…
In this paper, we introduce the problem of Matroid-Constrained Vertex Cover: given a graph with weights on the edges and a matroid imposed on the vertices, our problem is to choose a subset of vertices that is independent in the matroid,…
Let $G = (A \cup B,E)$ be a bipartite graph where the set $A$ consists of agents or main players and the set $B$ consists of jobs or secondary players. Every vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors. A matching $M$ is popular if for any…
Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable…
Two actively researched problem settings in matchings under preferences are popular matchings and the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. In this paper, we apply the optimality notion of the first topic to the…