Related papers: Random Initialization Solves Shapley's Fictitious …
While fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium in certain game classes, such as two-player zero-sum games, it is not guaranteed to converge in non-zero-sum and multiplayer games. We show that fictitious play in fact…
Fictitious Play (FP) is a simple and natural dynamic for repeated play with many applications in game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learning. It was introduced by Brown (1949,1951) and its convergence properties for two-player…
Fictitious play has recently emerged as the most accurate scalable algorithm for approximating Nash equilibrium strategies in multiplayer games. We show that the degree of equilibrium approximation error of fictitious play can be…
Fictitious play (FP) is one of the most fundamental game-theoretical learning frameworks for computing Nash equilibrium in $n$-player games, which builds the foundation for modern multi-agent learning algorithms. Although FP has provable…
The paper shows that smooth fictitious play converges to a neighborhood of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with probability 1 in almost all $N\times 2$ ($N$-player, two-action) potential games. The neighborhood of convergence may be made…
We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to…
We study the performance of Fictitious Play, when used as a heuristic for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium of a 2-player game. We exhibit a class of 2-player games having payoffs in the range [0,1] that show that Fictitious Play…
Fictitious play is an algorithm for computing Nash equilibria of matrix games. Recently, machine learning variants of fictitious play have been successfully applied to complicated real-world games. This paper presents a simple modification…
Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…
Fictitious play (FP) is a history-based strategy to choose actions in normal-form games, where players best-respond to the empirical frequency of their opponents' past actions. While it is well-established that FP converges to the set of…
We study the long-term behavior of the fictitious play process in repeated extensive-form games of imperfect information with perfect recall. Each player maintains incorrect beliefs that the moves at all information sets, except the one at…
The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…
Potential games, originally introduced in the early 1990's by Lloyd Shapley, the 2012 Nobel Laureate in Economics, and his colleague Dov Monderer, are a very important class of models in game theory. They have special properties such as the…
Fictitious play is a popular learning algorithm in which players that utilize the history of actions played by the players and the knowledge of their own payoff matrix can converge to the Nash equilibrium under certain conditions on the…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
Fictitious play (FP) is a natural learning dynamic in two-player zero-sum games. Samuel Karlin conjectured in 1959 that FP converges at a rate of $O(t^{-1/2})$ to Nash equilibrium, where $t$ is the number of steps played. However,…
We consider a game in which each player must find a compromise between more daring strategies that carry a high risk for him to be eliminated, and more cautious ones that, however, reduce his final score. For two symmetric players this game…
In the 60's Shapley provided an example of a two player fictitious game with periodic behaviour. In this game, player $A$ aims to copy $B$'s behaviour and player $B$ aims to play one ahead of player $A$. In this paper we generalize…
Considering the interaction through mutual interference of the different radio devices, the channel selection (CS) problem in decentralized parallel multiple access channels can be modeled by strategic-form games. Here, we show that the CS…
In this paper, a Nash-type fictitious game framework is introduced to handle a time-inconsistent linear-quadratic optimal control. The Nash-type game in this framework is called fictitious as it is between the decision maker (called real…