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In Evolutionary game theory the payoffs are typically fixed or shaped by external environmental variables. Here, we introduce an endogenous-feedback model in which the game played coevolves directly with the population state: the payoff…

The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant computations and determine the truth value of all relevant logical/mathematical…

Evolutionary game theory is an abstract and simple, but very powerful way to model evolutionary dynamics. Even complex biological phenomena can sometimes be abstracted to simple two-player games. But often, the interaction between several…

Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…

The evolution of preferences that account for other agents' fitness, or other-regarding preferences, has been modeled with the "indirect approach" to evolutionary game theory. Under the indirect evolutionary approach, agents make decisions…

In single-agent Markov decision processes, an agent can optimize its policy based on the interaction with environment. In multi-player Markov games (MGs), however, the interaction is non-stationary due to the behaviors of other players, so…

Iterated games provide a framework to describe social interactions among groups of individuals. Recent work stimulated by the discovery of "zero-determinant" strategies has rapidly expanded our ability to analyze such interactions. This…

The dynamics in games involving multiple players, who adaptively learn from their past experience, is not yet well understood. We analyzed a class of stochastic games with Markov strategies in which players choose their actions…

Elucidating the mechanisms that lead to cooperation is still one of the main scientific challenges of current times, as many common cooperative scenarios remain elusive and at odds with Darwin's natural selection theory. Here, we study…

It is commonly assumed that trust increases cooperation. However, game-theoretic models often fail to distinguish between cooperative actions and trust, making it difficult to independently measure trust and determine how its effects vary…

A canonical social dilemma arises when finite resources are allocated to a group of people, who can choose to either reciprocate with interest, or keep the proceeds for themselves. What resource allocation mechanisms will encourage levels…

Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…

Can players sustain long-run trust when their equilibrium beliefs are shaped by machine-learning methods that penalize complexity? I study a game in which an infinite sequence of agents with one-period recall decides whether to place trust…

How do people build up trust with artificial agents? Here, we study a key component of interpersonal trust: people's ability to evaluate the competence of another agent across repeated interactions. Prior work has largely focused on…

Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical toolkit to analyse the interactions that an individual agent has in a population and how the composition of strategies in this population evolves over time. While it can provide neat solutions to…

We examine behavior in an experimental collaboration game that incorporates endogenous network formation. The environment is modeled as a generalization of the voluntary contributions mechanism. By varying the information structure in a…

The last financial and economic crisis demonstrated the dysfunctional long-term effects of aggressive behaviour in financial markets. Yet, evolutionary game theory predicts that under the condition of strategic dependence a certain degree…

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash…

In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…

Albrecht and Stone (2018) state that modeling of changing behaviors remains an open problem "due to the essentially unconstrained nature of what other agents may do". In this work we evaluate the adaptability of neural artificial agents…