Related papers: ATTRITION: Attacking Static Hardware Trojan Detect…
Backdoors pose a serious threat to machine learning, as they can compromise the integrity of security-critical systems, such as self-driving cars. While different defenses have been proposed to address this threat, they all rely on the…
Hardware trojans are malicious circuits which compromise the functionality and security of an integrated circuit (IC). These circuits are manufactured directly into the silicon and cannot be fixed by security patches like software. The…
Electronic Design Automation (EDA) industry heavily reuses third party IP cores. These IP cores are vulnerable to insertion of Hardware Trojans (HTs) at design time by third party IP core providers or by malicious insiders in the design…
Deep learning architectures (DLA) have shown impressive performance in computer vision, natural language processing and so on. Many DLA make use of cloud computing to achieve classification due to the high computation and memory…
The risk of hardware Trojans being inserted at various stages of chip production has increased in a zero-trust fabless era. To counter this, various machine learning solutions have been developed for the detection of hardware Trojans. While…
Conventional Hardware Trojan (HT) detection techniques are based on the validation of integrated circuits to determine changes in their functionality, and on non-invasive side-channel analysis to identify the variations in their physical…
Owning a high-end semiconductor foundry is a luxury very few companies can afford. Thus, fabless design companies outsource integrated circuit fabrication to third parties. Within foundries, rogue elements may gain access to the customer's…
The threat of hardware Trojans (HTs) in security-critical IPs like cryptographic accelerators poses severe security risks. The HT detection methods available today mostly rely on golden models and detailed circuit specifications. Often they…
Trojans are one of the most threatening network attacks currently. HTTP-based Trojan, in particular, accounts for a considerable proportion of them. Moreover, as the network environment becomes more complex, HTTP-based Trojan is more…
With the globalization of the semiconductor manufacturing process, electronic devices are powerless against malicious modification of hardware in the supply chain. The ever-increasing threat of hardware Trojan attacks against integrated…
Outsourcing integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing to offshore foundries has grown exponentially in recent years. Given the critical role of ICs in the control and operation of vehicular systems and other modern engineering designs, such…
Trojan attacks on deep neural networks are both dangerous and surreptitious. Over the past few years, Trojan attacks have advanced from using only a single input-agnostic trigger and targeting only one class to using multiple,…
Industrial Systems-on-Chips (SoCs) often comprise hundreds of thousands to millions of nets and millions to tens of millions of connectivity edges, making empirical evaluation of hardware-Trojan (HT) detectors on realistic designs both…
Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications in digital designs that can be inserted by untrusted supply chain entities. Hardware Trojans can give rise to diverse attack vectors such as information leakage (e.g. MOLES Trojan) and…
Traditional learning-based approaches for run-time Hardware Trojan detection require complex and expensive on-chip data acquisition frameworks and thus incur high area and power overhead. To address these challenges, we propose to leverage…
The globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain has moved most of the design, fabrication, and testing process from a single trusted entity to various untrusted third-party entities around the world. The risk of using…
The use of third-party IP cores in implementing applications in FPGAs has given rise to the threat of malicious alterations through the insertion of hardware Trojans. To address this threat, it is important to predict the way hardware…
Machine-learning based intrusion detection classifiers are able to detect unknown attacks, but at the same time, they may be susceptible to evasion by obfuscation techniques. An adversary intruder which possesses a crucial knowledge about a…
A globally distributed IC supply chain brings risks due to untrusted third parties. The risks span inadvertent use of hardware Trojan (HT), inserted Intellectual Property (3P-IP) or Electronic Design Automation (EDA) flows. HT can introduce…
Recent work has identified that classification models implemented as neural networks are vulnerable to data-poisoning and Trojan attacks at training time. In this work, we show that these training-time vulnerabilities extend to deep…