Related papers: Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World
We derive a first order optimality condition for a class of agent-based systems, as well as for their mean-field counterpart. A relevant difficulty of our analysis is that the state equation is formulated on possibly infinite-dimensional…
In this paper, we consider the problem of a Principal aiming at designing a reward function for a population of heterogeneous agents. We construct an incentive based on the ranking of the agents, so that a competition among the latter is…
The cooperation mechanism of indirect reciprocity has been studied by making multiple variations of its parts. This research proposes a new variant of Nowak and Sigmund model, focused on agents' attitude; it is called Individualistic…
We study information design in multi-agent systems (MAS) with binary actions and strategic complementarities, where an external designer influences behavior only through signals. Agents play the smallest-equilibrium of the induced Bayesian…
Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-receiver model by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), in which there…
Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms. This paper applies this…
We study a decision-maker's problem of finding optimal monetary incentive schemes for retention when faced with agents whose participation decisions (stochastically) depend on the incentive they receive. Our focus is on policies constrained…
We study a two-period moral hazard problem; there are two agents, with action sets that are unknown to the principal. The principal contracts with each agent sequentially, and seeks to maximize the worst-case discounted sum of payoffs,…
Linear contracts are ubiquitous in practice, yet optimal contract theory often prescribes complex, nonlinear structures. We provide a distributional robustness justification for linear contracts. We study a principal-agent problem where the…
We study a moral hazard problem with adverse selection: a risk-neutral agent can directly control the output distribution and possess private information about the production environment. The principal designs a menu of contracts satisfying…
A principal provides nondiscriminatory incentives for independent and identical agents. The principal cannot observe the agents' actions, nor does she know the entire set of actions available to them. It is shown, very generally, that any…
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. These mechanisms include assortative or networked…
A seller is selling a pair of divisible complementary goods to an agent. The agent consumes the goods only in a specific ratio and freely disposes of excess in either goods. The value of the bundle and the ratio are private information of…
Imitation can be viewed as a means of enhancing learning in multiagent environments. It augments an agent's ability to learn useful behaviors by making intelligent use of the knowledge implicit in behaviors demonstrated by cooperative…
Conventional distributed approaches to coverage control may suffer from lack of convergence and poor performance, due to the fact that agents have limited information, especially in non-convex discrete environments. To address this issue,…
We consider the optimal risk sharing problem with a continuum of agents, modeled via a non-atomic measure space. Individual preferences are not assumed to be convex. We show the multiplicity of agents induces the value function to be…
A monopolist wishes to maximize her profits by finding an optimal price policy. After she announces a menu of products and prices, each agent $x$ will choose to buy that product $y(x)$ which maximizes his own utility, if positive. The…
We characterize the extreme points of the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms for screening problems with linear utility. Our framework subsumes problems with and without transfers, such as monopoly pricing, principal-optimal bilateral…
Traditional approaches to the design of multi-agent navigation algorithms consider the environment as a fixed constraint, despite the influence of spatial constraints on agents' performance. Yet hand-designing conducive environment layouts…
We consider a two-road dynamic routing game where the state of one of the roads (the "risky road") is stochastic and may change over time. This generates room for experimentation. A central planner may wish to induce some of the (finite…