Related papers: Principal-Multiagents problem under equivalent cha…
We introduce an agent-based model of delegation relationships between a principal and an agent, which is based on the standard-hidden action model introduced by Holmstr\"om and, by doing so, provide a model which can be used to further…
A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A key challenge addressed by contracts -- known in economics…
In this article we consider the infinite-horizon Merton investment-consumption problem in a constant-parameter Black - Scholes - Merton market for an agent with constant relative risk aversion R. The classical primal approach is to write…
This paper proposes a method to construct an adaptive agent that is universal with respect to a given class of experts, where each expert is an agent that has been designed specifically for a particular environment. This adaptive control…
AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts…
We consider a broad class of dynamic programming (DP) problems that involve a partially linear structure and some positivity properties in their system equation and cost function. We address deterministic and stochastic problems, possibly…
I study a moral hazard problem between a principal and multiple agents who experience positive peer effects represented by a (weighted) network. Under the optimal linear contract, the principal provides high-powered incentives to central…
We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…
We provide an overview on how to use the measurable selection techniques to derive the dynamic programming principle for a general stochastic optimal control/stopping problem. By considering its martingale problem formulation on the…
A principal and an agent can launch a project under unanimous consent. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an underlying state, and the agent privately knows his own preference. The principal can conduct a test to learn…
We consider a critically-loaded multiclass queueing control problem with model uncertainty. The model consists of $I$ types of customers and a single server. At any time instant, a decision-maker (DM) allocates the server's effort to the…
Adjustable autonomy refers to entities dynamically varying their own autonomy, transferring decision-making control to other entities (typically agents transferring control to human users) in key situations. Determining whether and when…
We study a new class of contract design problems where a principal delegates the execution of multiple projects to a set of agents. The principal's expected reward from each project is a combinatorial function of the agents working on it.…
We characterize the value of swing contracts in continuous time as the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation with suitable boundary conditions. The case of contracts with penalties is straightforward, and in that…
We study a problem of utility maximization under model uncertainty with information including jumps. We prove first that the value process of the robust stochastic control problem is described by the solution of a quadratic-exponential…
In this work we present a novel approach to solving concurrent multiagent planning problems in which several agents act in parallel. Our approach relies on a compilation from concurrent multiagent planning to classical planning, allowing us…
Difference-in-differences is a common method for estimating treatment effects, and the parallel trends condition is its main identifying assumption: the trend in mean untreated outcomes is independent of the observed treatment status. In…
In the combinatorial-action contract model (D\"utting et al., FOCS'21) a principal delegates the execution of a complex project to an agent, who can choose any subset from a given set of actions. Each set of actions incurs a cost to the…
Today's multiagent systems have grown too complex to rely on centralized controllers, prompting increasing interest in the design of distributed algorithms. In this respect, game theory has emerged as a valuable tool to complement more…