Related papers: Near-Optimal $\Phi$-Regret Learning in Extensive-F…
This work tackles the complexities of multi-player scenarios in \emph{unknown games}, where the primary challenge lies in navigating the uncertainty of the environment through bandit feedback alongside strategic decision-making. We…
We consider the problem of minimizing different notions of swap regret in online optimization. These forms of regret are tightly connected to correlated equilibrium concepts in games, and have been more recently shown to guarantee…
$\Phi$-equilibria -- and the associated notion of $\Phi$-regret -- are a powerful and flexible framework at the heart of online learning and game theory, whereby enriching the set of deviations $\Phi$ begets stronger notions of rationality.…
In the setting of online learning, Implicit algorithms turn out to be highly successful from a practical standpoint. However, the tightest regret analyses only show marginal improvements over Online Mirror Descent. In this work, we shed…
This paper investigates the sublinear regret guarantees of two non-no-regret algorithms in zero-sum games: Fictitious Play, and Online Gradient Descent with constant stepsizes. In general adversarial online learning settings, both…
We develop an operator algebraic framework for infinite games with a continuum of agents and prove that regret based learning dynamics governed by a noncommutative continuity equation converge to a unique quantal response equilibrium under…
In this paper, we investigate the existence of online learning algorithms with bandit feedback that simultaneously guarantee $O(1)$ regret compared to a given comparator strategy, and $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret compared to any fixed…
In this paper, we introduce the first algorithmic framework for Blackwell approachability on the sequence-form polytope, the class of convex polytopes capturing the strategies of players in extensive-form games (EFGs). This leads to a new…
The CFR framework has been a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games in practice. However, the theoretical rate at which past CFR-based algorithms converge to the Nash equilibrium is on the order of $O(T^{-1/2})$, where…
In online convex optimization, the player aims to minimize regret, or the difference between her loss and that of the best fixed decision in hindsight over the entire repeated game. Algorithms that minimize (standard) regret may converge to…
Understanding how to efficiently learn while adhering to safety constraints is essential for using online reinforcement learning in practical applications. However, proving rigorous regret bounds for safety-constrained reinforcement…
We consider a number of questions related to tradeoffs between reward and regret in repeated gameplay between two agents. To facilitate this, we introduce a notion of $\textit{generalized equilibrium}$ which allows for asymmetric regret…
We study online learning in two-player uninformed Markov games, where the opponent's actions and policies are unobserved. In this setting, Tian et al. (2021) show that achieving no-external-regret is impossible without incurring an…
The behavior of no-regret learning algorithms is well understood in two-player min-max (i.e, zero-sum) games. In this paper, we investigate the behavior of no-regret learning in min-max games with dependent strategy sets, where the strategy…
We consider a generalization of the celebrated Online Convex Optimization (OCO) framework with adversarial online constraints. In this problem, an online learner interacts with an adversary sequentially over multiple rounds. At the…
Any reinforcement learning algorithm that applies to all Markov decision processes (MDPs) will suffer $\Omega(\sqrt{SAT})$ regret on some MDP, where $T$ is the elapsed time and $S$ and $A$ are the cardinalities of the state and action…
Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…
Motivated by the stringent safety requirements that are often present in real-world applications, we study a safe online convex optimization setting where the player needs to simultaneously achieve sublinear regret and zero constraint…
This paper presents a new framework for analyzing and designing no-regret algorithms for dynamic (possibly adversarial) systems. The proposed framework generalizes the popular online convex optimization framework and extends it to its…
A considerable chasm has been looming for decades between theory and practice in zero-sum game solving through first-order methods. Although a convergence rate of $T^{-1}$ has long been established, the most effective paradigm in practice…