Related papers: Maximum Stable Matching with Matroids and Partial …
In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the stable matching problem. In particular, we consider the setting where preferences may contain ties. For this generalization, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem…
We study a discrete version of a geometric stable marriage problem originally proposed in a continuous setting by Hoffman, Holroyd, and Peres, in which points in the plane are stably matched to cluster centers, as prioritized by their…
Robust Stable Marriage (RSM) is a variant of the classical Stable Marriage problem, where the robustness of a given stable matching is measured by the number of modifications required for repairing it in case an unforeseen event occurs. We…
The stable matching problem is one of the central problems of algorithmic game theory. If participants are allowed to have ties, the problem of finding a stable matching of maximum cardinality is an NP-hard problem, even when the ties are…
The stable matching problem has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since the seminal 1962 paper by Gale and Shapley. The number of stable matchings for different systems of preferences has been studied in many…
In multi-criteria optimization problems, several objective functions have to be optimized. Since the different objective functions are usually in conflict with each other, one cannot consider only one particular solution as the optimal…
Given a graph $G = (V,E)$ where every vertex has a weak ranking over its neighbors, we consider the problem of computing an optimal matching as per agent preferences. Classical notions of optimality such as stability and its relaxation…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties,…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
We consider Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints (SMC): in this variant of Stable Marriage, we distinguish a subset of women as well as a subset of men, and we seek a matching with fewest number of blocking pairs that matches all of…
We study the problem of finding a maximum matching in a graph given by an input stream listing its edges in some arbitrary order, where the quantity to be maximized is given by a monotone submodular function on subsets of edges. This…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents…
This paper has two objectives. One is to give a linear time algorithm that solves the stable roommates problem (i.e., obtains one stable matching) using the stable marriage problem. The idea is that a stable matching of a roommate instance…
One of the most important open problems in machine scheduling is the problem of scheduling a set of jobs on unrelated machines to minimize the makespan. The best known approximation algorithm for this problem guarantees an approximation…
We study the problem of maximizing a non-negative monotone submodular objective $f$ subject to the intersection of $k$ arbitrary matroid constraints. The natural greedy algorithm guarantees $(k+1)$-approximation for this problem, and the…
We study the problem of finding "fair" stable matchings in the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI). For an instance $I$ of SMI there may be many stable matchings, providing significantly different outcomes for the sets of…
The Submodular Welfare Maximization problem (SWM) captures an important subclass of combinatorial auctions and has been studied extensively from both computational and economic perspectives. In particular, it has been studied in a natural…
The Restricted Assignment Problem is a prominent special case of Scheduling on Parallel Unrelated Machines. For the strongest known linear programming relaxation, the configuration LP, we improve the non-constructive bound on its…