Related papers: Mechanism Learning for Trading Networks
We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single…
Algorithmic trading systems are often completely automated, and deep learning is increasingly receiving attention in this domain. Nonetheless, little is known about the robustness properties of these models. We study valuation models for…
Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only…
Besides the complexity in time or in number of messages, a common approach for analyzing distributed algorithms is to look at the assumptions they make on the underlying network. We investigate this question from the perspective of network…
The combinatorial multi-armed bandit model is designed to maximize cumulative rewards in the presence of uncertainty by activating a subset of arms in each round. This paper is inspired by two critical applications in wireless networks,…
We consider a group of strategic agents who must each repeatedly take one of two possible actions. They learn which of the two actions is preferable from initial private signals, and by observing the actions of their neighbors in a social…
This study investigates the development of an optimal execution strategy through reinforcement learning, aiming to determine the most effective approach for traders to buy and sell inventory within a finite time horizon. Our proposed model…
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first…
Trading markets represent a real-world financial application to deploy reinforcement learning agents, however, they carry hard fundamental challenges such as high variance and costly exploration. Moreover, markets are inherently a…
In modern advertising platforms, learning algorithms are deployed by budget-constrained bidders to maximize their accumulated value. These algorithms often offer classical utility guarantees like no-regret, i.e., the agent's utility is at…
Many important resource allocation problems involve the combinatorial assignment of items, e.g., auctions or course allocation. Because the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items, preference elicitation is a key challenge…
We study the problem of decision-making in the setting of a scarcity of shared resources when the preferences of agents are unknown a priori and must be learned from data. Taking the two-sided matching market as a running example, we focus…
A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known distribution. The buyer privately learns about his type via a signal. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism in…
Classical Bayesian mechanism design relies on the common prior assumption, but such prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent mechanisms that relax this assumption: the seller is selling an…
A striking limitation of human cognition is our inability to execute some tasks simultaneously. Recent work suggests that such limitations can arise from a fundamental tradeoff in network architectures that is driven by the sharing of…
We study the problem of learning revenue-optimal multi-bidder auctions from samples when the samples of bidders' valuations can be adversarially corrupted or drawn from distributions that are adversarially perturbed. First, we prove tight…
Mechanism design is pivotal to federated learning (FL) for maximizing social welfare by coordinating self-interested clients. Existing mechanisms, however, often overlook the network effects of client participation and the diverse model…
Online learning algorithms are widely used in strategic multi-agent settings, including repeated auctions, contract design, and pricing competitions, where agents adapt their strategies over time. A key question in such environments is how…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
Several scenarios of interacting neural networks which are trained either in an identical or in a competitive way are solved analytically. In the case of identical training each perceptron receives the output of its neighbour. The symmetry…