Related papers: Pricing Novel Goods
A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some.…
In many online advertisement (ad) exchanges, ad slots are each sold via a separate second-price auction. This paper considers the bidder's problem of maximizing the value of ads they purchase in these auctions, subject to budget…
The combinatorial pricing problem (CPP) is a bilevel problem in which the leader maximizes their revenue by imposing tolls on certain items that they can control. Based on the tolls set by the leader, the follower selects a subset of items…
Pricing financial or real options with arbitrary payoffs in regime-switching models is an important problem in finance. Mathematically, it is to solve, under certain standard assumptions, a general form of optimal stopping problems in…
How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the persuader employs a mechanism to first elicit the agent's…
Bilateral bargaining under incomplete information provides a controlled testbed for evaluating large language model (LLM) agent capabilities. Bilateral trade demands individual rationality, strategic surplus maximization, and cooperation to…
We study the optimal behavior of a bidder in a real-time auction subject to the requirement that a specified collections of heterogeneous items be acquired within given time constraints. The problem facing this bidder is cast as a…
Bilateral trade models the problem of intermediating between two rational agents -- a seller and a buyer -- both characterized by a private valuation for an item they want to trade. We study the online learning version of the problem, in…
We consider the problem of optimal trading for a power producer in the context of intraday electricity markets. The aim is to minimize the imbalance cost induced by the random residual demand in electricity, i.e. the consumption from the…
This paper studies optimal mechanisms for collecting and trading data. Consumers benefit from revealing information about their tastes to a service provider because this improves the service. However, the information is also valuable to a…
We study problems arising in real-time auction markets, common in e-commerce and computational advertising, where bidders face the problem of calculating optimal bids. We focus upon a contract management problem where a demand aggregator is…
Welfare maximization in bilateral trade has been extensively studied in recent years. Previous literature obtained incentive-compatible approximation mechanisms only for the private values case. In this paper, we study welfare maximization…
We consider algorithms for solving structured convex optimization problems over a network of agents with communication delays. It is assumed that each agent performs its local updates by using possibly outdated information from its…
We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents. Assuming the platform is a revenue maximizer, it observes market features that generally affect demand. Since only the equilibrium price and quantity are…
Modern AI systems increasingly operate inside markets and institutions where data, behavior, and incentives are endogenous. This paper develops an economic foundation for multi-agent learning by studying a principal-agent interaction in a…
We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a…
Firms have access to abundant data on market participants. They use these data to target contracts to agents with specific characteristics, and describe these contracts in opaque terms. In response to such practices, recent proposed…
We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset of a given set of unobservable actions, each of which has an…
Economic theory has provided an estimable intuition in understanding the perplexing ideologies in law, in the areas of economic law, tort law, contract law, procedural law and many others. Most legal systems require the parties involved in…
We consider the classical linear assignment problem, and we introduce new auction algorithms for its optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are founded on duality theory, and are related to ideas of competitive bidding by persons…