Related papers: Zero-sum continuous-time Markov games with one-sid…

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games which unilaterally control payoffs. Zero-determinant strategies have attracted much attention in studies of social dilemma, particularly in the context of evolution of…

We establish existence of nearly-optimal controls, conditions for existence of an optimal control and a saddle-point for respectively a control problem and zero-sum differential game associated with payoff functionals of mean-field type,…

We consider a non-cooperative constrained stochastic games with N players with the following special structure. With each player there is an associated controlled Markov chain. The transition probabilities of the i-th Markov chain depend…

This paper is concerned with the switching game of a one-dimensional backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). The associated Bellman-Isaacs equation is a system of matrix-valued BSDEs living in a special unbounded convex domain…

In a single-state repeated game, zero-determinant strategies can unilaterally force functions of the payoffs to take values in particular closed intervals. When the explicit use of a determinant is absent from the analysis, they are instead…

This paper is interested in the problem of optimal stopping in a mean field game context. The notion of mixed solution is introduced to solve the system of partial differential equations which models this kind of problem. This notion…

We consider a general type of non-Markovian impulse control problems under adverse non-linear expectation or, more specifically, the zero-sum game problem where the adversary player decides the probability measure. We show that the upper…

In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic games of the mean-field type with a finite number $N$ of agents subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of each agent is a locally compact Polish…

We study self-triggered two-player stochastic games on Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes (PDMPs) where each agent decides when to observe and which open-loop action to hold. Augmenting the state with clocks and committed controls…

Certain but important classes of strategic-form games, including zero-sum and identical-interest games, have the fictitious-play-property (FPP), i.e., beliefs formed in fictitious play dynamics always converge to a Nash equilibrium (NE) in…

We show the convergence of finite state symmetric N-player differential games, where players control their transition rates from state to state, to a limiting dynamics given by a finite state Mean Field Game system made of two coupled…

Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding $N$-player games, they are of…

Under non-exponential discounting, we develop a dynamic theory for stopping problems in continuous time. Our framework covers discount functions that induce decreasing impatience. Due to the inherent time inconsistency, we look for…

This paper presents Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) formulations for two classes of two-player zero-sum games: one with a maximum cost value over time, and one with a minimum cost value over time. In the zero-sum game setting, player A minimizes the…

This paper considers the optimal control of time varying continuous time Markov chains whose transition rates are themselves Markov processes. In one set of problems the solution of an ordinary differential equation is shown to determine…

We consider robust Markov Decision Processes with Borel state and action spaces, unbounded cost and finite time horizon. Our formulation leads to a Stackelberg game against nature. Under integrability, continuity and compactness assumptions…

On a filtered probability space $(\Omega ,\mathcal{F}, (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t\in[0,\infty]}, \mathbb{P})$, we consider the two-player non-zero-sum stopping game $u^i := \mathbb{E}[U^i(\rho,\tau)],\ i=1,2$, where the first player choose a…

We investigate a time-inconsistent, non-Markovian finite-player game in continuous time, where each player's objective functional depends non-linearly on the expected value of the state process. As a result, the classical Bellman optimality…

Unlike Poker where the action space $\mathcal{A}$ is discrete, differential games in the physical world often have continuous action spaces not amenable to discrete abstraction, rendering no-regret algorithms with…

For a discrete time Markov chain and in line with Strotz' consistent planning we develop a framework for problems of optimal stopping that are time-inconsistent due to the consideration of a non-linear function of an expected reward. We…