Related papers: Computing Candidate Prices in Budget-Constrained P…
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…
In this paper we consider multidimensional mechanism design problem for selling discrete substitutable items to a group of buyers. Previous work on this problem mostly focus on stochastic description of valuations used by the seller.…
This paper studies online optimization under inventory (budget) constraints. While online optimization is a well-studied topic, versions with inventory constraints have proven difficult. We consider a formulation of inventory-constrained…
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…
A recent line of research has established a novel desideratum for designing approximately-revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, namely the buy-many constraint. Under this constraint, prices for different allocations made by the mechanism…
In the design and analysis of revenue-maximizing auctions, auction performance is typically measured with respect to a prior distribution over inputs. The most obvious source for such a distribution is past data. The goal is to understand…
We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…
In this paper, we derive bounds for profit maximizing prior-free procurement auctions where a buyer wishes to procure multiple units of a homogeneous item from n sellers who are strategic about their per unit valuation. The buyer earns the…
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently distributed. We focus on general joint distributions, seeking…
We provide a constructive proof of Border's theorem [Bor91, HR15a] and its generalization to reduced-form auctions with asymmetric bidders [Bor07, MV10, CKM13]. Given a reduced form, we identify a subset of Border constraints that are…
Internet advertisers (buyers) repeatedly procure ad impressions from ad platforms (sellers) with the aim to maximize total conversion (i.e. ad value) while respecting both budget and return-on-investment (ROI) constraints for efficient…
We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist seller with $m$ heterogeneous items faces a single buyer and seeks to maximize her…
Selling a single item to $n$ self-interested buyers is a fundamental problem in economics, where the two objectives typically considered are welfare maximization and revenue maximization. Since the optimal mechanisms are often impractical…
Core-selecting combinatorial auctions are popular auction designs that constrain prices to eliminate the incentive for any group of bidders -- with the seller -- to renegotiate for a better deal. They help overcome the low-revenue issues of…
We study the aggregate welfare and individual regret guarantees of dynamic \emph{pacing algorithms} in the context of repeated auctions with budgets. Such algorithms are commonly used as bidding agents in Internet advertising platforms,…
We develop a framework for the optimal pricing and product design of LLMs in which a provider sells menus of token budgets to users who differ in their valuations across a continuum of tasks. Under a homogeneous production technology, we…
We address auctions in two-sided markets with budget constraints on buyers, a fundamental setting also crucial for applications such as display advertising. Our goal is to design efficient mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive…
In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design…
We study a natural combinatorial pricing problem for sequentially arriving buyers with equal budgets. Each buyer is interested in exactly one pair of items and purchases this pair if and only if, upon arrival, both items are still available…