Related papers: Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
We consider control strategies for large-scale interacting agent systems under uncertainty. The particular focus is on the design of robust controls that allow to bound the variance of the controlled system over time. To this end we…
Real-life applications of deferred-acceptance (DA) matching algorithms sometimes exhibit errors or changes to the matching inputs that are discovered only after the algorithm has been run and the results are announced to participants.…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
We pose an active perception problem where an autonomous agent actively interacts with a second agent with potentially adversarial behaviors. Given the uncertainty in the intent of the other agent, the objective is to collect further…
We consider the problem of synthesizing resilient and stochastically stable strategies for systems of cooperating agents striving to minimize the expected time between consecutive visits to selected locations in a known environment. A…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
Large language model-based web agents have demonstrated strong performance on realistic web interaction tasks. However, existing evaluations are predominantly conducted under relatively stable and well-behaved interaction conditions, which…
We investigate the question: if an AI agent is known to be safe in one setting, is it also safe in a new setting similar to the first? This is a core question of AI alignment--we train and test models in a certain environment, but deploy…
We study a general class of dynamic multi-agent decision problems with asymmetric information and non-strategic agents, which includes dynamic teams as a special case. When agents are non-strategic, an agent's strategy is known to the other…
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…
Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…
In decision-dependent games, multiple players optimize their decisions under a data distribution that shifts with their joint actions, creating complex dynamics in applications like market pricing. A practical consequence of these dynamics…
Sample average approximation (SAA) is a widely popular approach to data-driven decision-making under uncertainty. Under mild assumptions, SAA is both tractable and enjoys strong asymptotic performance guarantees. Similar guarantees,…
Increasing aggregate diversity (or catalog coverage) is an important system-level objective in many recommendation domains where it may be desirable to mitigate the popularity bias and to improve the coverage of long-tail items in…
We study popularity for matchings under preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that do not lose against any other matching in a majority vote by the agents. A popular matching is said to be robust if it is popular among…
We consider a setting in which $N$ agents aim to speedup a common Stochastic Approximation (SA) problem by acting in parallel and communicating with a central server. We assume that the up-link transmissions to the server are subject to…
In this paper I discuss truthful equilibria in common agency models. Specifically, I provide general conditions under which truthful equilibria are plausible, easy to calculate and efficient. These conditions generalize similar results in…