Related papers: Towards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value I: C…

Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the implementation of pro-poser/builder separation (PBS) on Ethereum,…

We analyze maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This concurrency breaks the single builder assumption of…

Blockchains offer strong security gurarantees, but cannot protect users against the ordering of transactions. Players such as miners, bots and validators can reorder various transactions and reap significant profits, called the Maximal…

We consider the problem of optimally executing an order involving multiple crypto-assets, sometimes called tokens, on a network of multiple constant function market makers (CFMMs). When we ignore the fixed cost associated with executing an…

In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). The transition from spam-based Priority Gas Auctions to…

We study the feasibility, profitability, and prevalence of sandwich attacks on Ethereum rollups with private mempools. First, we extend a formal model of optimal front- and back-run sizing, relating attack profitability to victim trade…

We consider the social welfare that can be facilitated by a constant function market maker (CFMM). When there is sufficient liquidity available to the CFMM, it can approximate the optimal social welfare when all users transactions are…

This paper analyzes the Execution Tickets proposal on Ethereum Research, unveiling its potential to revolutionize the Ethereum blockchain's economic model. At the core of this proposal lies a novel ticketing mechanism poised to redefine how…

We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition, in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as Ethereum. We argue that the core is a suitable solution…

Ethereum block builders run sealed auctions among searchers, but nothing in the protocol forces a builder to honor the auction outcome after observing submitted bundles. This paper studies the commitment problem. We model a builder who…

This paper addresses the lack of research on quantifying Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) on Ethereum Layer 2 networks (L2s). Our findings reveal a substantial amount of MEV to be extracted on L2s, particularly on Polygon, with a lower bound…

We study optimal auction design for Maximum Extractable Value (MEV) auction markets on Ethereum. Using a dataset of 2.2 million transactions across three major orderflow providers, we establish three empirical regularities: extracted values…

The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model…

Blockchains have popularized the Automated Market Makers (AMMs), where users trade crypto-assets directly with a smart contract, governed by a pricing function embedded in the contract's code. Today, users of AMMs are often forced to accept…

Extreme value theory (EVT) provides an elegant mathematical tool for the statistical analysis of rare events. When data are collected from multiple population subgroups, because some subgroups may have less data available for extreme value…

Maximum extractable value (MEV) has been extensively studied. In most papers, the researchers have worked with the Ethereum blockchain almost exclusively. Even though, Ethereum and other blockchains have dynamic gas prices this is not the…

In this article, we develop an interdisciplinary analysis of MEV which desires to merge the gap that exists between technical and legal research supporting policymakers in their regulatory decisions concerning blockchains, DeFi and…

Strategies related to the blockchain concept of Extractable Value (MEV/BEV), such as arbitrage, front-, or back-running create strong economic incentives for network nodes to reduce latency. Modified nodes, that minimize transaction…

We study a novel automated market maker design: the function maximizing AMM (FM-AMM). Our central assumption is that trades are batched before execution. Because of competition between arbitrageurs, the FM-AMM eliminates arbitrage profits…

Traditional blockchains grant the miner of a block full control not only over which transactions but also their order. This constitutes a major flaw discovered with the introduction of decentralized finance and allows miners to perform MEV…