Related papers: Rationality-Robust Information Design: Bayesian Pe…
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender…
An analyst observes the frequency with which an agent takes actions, but not the frequency with which she takes actions conditional on a payoff relevant state. In this setting, we ask when the analyst can rationalize the agent's choices as…
We consider a finite-horizon discrete-time dynamic system that is jointly controlled by two strategic agents. There is a system designer that has its own reward function but does not have direct control over the agents' actions. We consider…
We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits. In a large class of binary-action games, opacity design is just as good as full commitment to actions…
How does one test empirically the hypothesis that a decision maker (DM) is being influenced by information via Bayesian persuasion? In this paper, I consider a DM whose state-dependent preferences are known to an analyst, who sees the…
We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncertainty. We consider the classic Bayesian decision-theoretic model pioneered by [Blackwell, 1951, 1953]. Initially, the data buyer has only…
We argue that an explainable artificial intelligence must possess a rationale for its decisions, be able to infer the purpose of observed behaviour, and be able to explain its decisions in the context of what its audience understands and…
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers…
Perfectly rational decision-makers maximize expected utility, but crucially ignore the resource costs incurred when determining optimal actions. Here we employ an axiomatic framework for bounded rational decision-making based on a…
Recently, there has been a growing interest in modeling planning with information constraints. Accordingly, an agent maximizes a regularized expected utility known as the free energy, where the regularizer is given by the information…
Human-sensor systems have a wide range of applications in fields such as robotics, healthcare, and finance. These systems utilize sensors to observe the true state of nature and generate strategically designed signals, aiding humans in…
We study computational questions in a game-theoretic model that, in particular, aims to capture advertising/persuasion applications such as viral marketing. Specifically, we consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion model where an informed…
Adaptive agent design offers a way to improve human-AI collaboration on time-sensitive tasks in rapidly changing environments. In such cases, to ensure the human maintains an accurate understanding of critical task elements, an assistive…
We describe a general approach to modeling rational decision-making agents who adopt either quantum or classical mechanics based on the Quantum Bayesian (QBist) approach to quantum theory. With the additional ingredient of a scheme by which…
We study a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in sequential decision-making settings. An informed principal observes an external parameter of the world and advises an uninformed agent about actions to take over time. The agent takes…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…
Reinforcement learning (RL) is inspired by the way human infants and animals learn from the environment. The setting is somewhat idealized because, in actual tasks, other agents in the environment have their own goals and behave adaptively…
We address Bayesian persuasion between a sender and a receiver with state-dependent quadratic cost measures for general classes of distributions. The receiver seeks to make mean-square-error estimate of a state based on a signal sent by the…
We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form…