Related papers: Rawlsian Assignments
The theory of algorithmic fair allocation is within the center of multi-agent systems and economics in the last decade due to its industrial and social importance. At a high level, the problem is to assign a set of items that are either…
We study classic fair-division problems in a partial information setting. This paper respectively addresses fair division of rent, cake, and indivisible goods among agents with cardinal preferences. We will show that, for all of these…
Motivated by the common academic problem of allocating papers to referees for conference reviewing we propose a novel mechanism for solving the assignment problem when we have a two sided matching problem with preferences from one side (the…
This paper exhibits a duality between the theory of Revealed Preference of Afriat and the housing allocation problem of Shapley and Scarf. In particular, it is shown that Afriat's theorem can be interpreted as a second welfare theorem in…
We study the question of existence and fast computation of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible resources among agents with additive valuations. As such allocations may not exist for arbitrary instances, we ask if they exist for…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…
Fairness and privacy are two important concerns in social decision-making processes such as resource allocation. We study privacy in the fair allocation of indivisible resources using the well-established framework of differential privacy.…
Given a set of $n$ individuals with strict preferences over $m$ indivisible objects, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism is a method for allocating objects to individuals in a way that is efficient, fair, and…
We study how to fairly allocate a set of indivisible chores to a group of agents, where each agent $i$ has a non-negative weight $w_i$ that represents its obligation for undertaking the chores. We consider the fairness notion of weighted…
We consider the multi-unit random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects and objects are allocated to agents randomly based on the preferences. The most well-established preference relation to compare random…
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…
Fair division has long been an important problem in the economics literature. In this note, we consider the existence of proportionally fair allocations of indivisible goods, i.e., allocations of indivisible goods in which every agent gets…
The fundamental assignment problem is in search of welfare maximization mechanisms to allocate items to agents when the private preferences over indivisible items are provided by self-interested agents. The mainstream mechanism…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, which captures, for example, the distribution of ministries among political parties in a coalition government. Our focus is on picking…
This paper provides a novel solution to a task allocation problem, by which a group of agents decides on the assignment of a discrete set of tasks in a distributed manner. In this setting, heterogeneous agents have individual preferences…
This paper studies preference aggregation under uncertainty in the multi-profile framework and characterizes a new class of aggregation rules that address classical concerns about Harsanyi's (1955) utilitarian rules. Our aggregation rules,…
Envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency are two major goals in welfare economics. The existence of an allocation that satisfies both conditions has been studied for a long time. Whether items are indivisible or divisible, it is impossible to…
A simple mechanism for allocating indivisible resources is sequential allocation in which agents take turns to pick items. We focus on possible and necessary allocation problems, checking whether allocations of a given form occur in some or…
We consider the assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over $m$ objects and the objects are allocated to the agents based on the preferences. In a recent paper, Brams, Kilgour, and Klamler (2014) presented the AL…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…