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This work lies in the fusion of experimental economics and data mining. It continues author's previous work on mining behaviour rules of human subjects from experimental data, where game-theoretic predictions partially fail to work.…

Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have…

Behavioral experiments on the Ultimatum Game have shown that we human beings have remarkable preference in fair play, contradicting the predictions by the game theory. Most of the existing models seeking for explanations, however, strictly…

Experimental economics has repeatedly demonstrated that the Nash equilibrium makes inaccurate predictions for a vast set of games. Instead, several alternative theoretical concepts predict behavior that is much more in tune with observed…

Humans are not homo economicus (i.e., rational economic beings). As humans, we exhibit systematic behavioral biases such as loss aversion, anchoring, framing, etc., which lead us to make suboptimal economic decisions. Insofar as such biases…

The noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution of classical games corresponds to a rational expectations attitude on the part of the players. However, in many cases, games played by human players have outcomes very different from Nash…

Situations where people have to decide between hurting themselves or another person are at the core of many individual and global conflicts. Yet little is known about how people behave when facing these situations in the lab. Here we report…

The use of equilibrium models in economics springs from the desire for parsimonious models of economic phenomena that take human reasoning into account. This approach has been the cornerstone of modern economic theory. We explain why this…

Economies and societal structures in general are complex stochastic systems which may not lend themselves well to algebraic analysis. An addition of subjective value criteria to the mechanics of interacting agents will further complicate…

One-shot anonymous unselfishness in economic games is commonly explained by social preferences, which assume that people care about the monetary payoffs of others. However, during the last ten years, research has shown that different types…

Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…

Human behavior is one of the main problems for evolution, as it is often the case that human actions are disadvantageous for the self and advantageous for other people. Behind this puzzle are our beliefs about rational behavior, based on…

Modelling agent preferences has applications in a range of fields including economics and increasingly, artificial intelligence. These preferences are not always known and thus may need to be estimated from observed behavior, in which case…

Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…

The quantitative aspirations of economists and financial analysts have for many years been based on the belief that it should be possible to build models of economic systems - and financial markets in particular - that are as predictive as…

In statistical physics, the conservation of particle number results in the equalization of the chemical potential throughout a system at equilibrium. In contrast, the homogeneity of utility in socio-economic models is usually thought to…

We consider the problem of estimating preferences of human agents from data of strategic systems where the agents repeatedly interact. Recently, it was demonstrated that a new estimation method called "quantal regret" produces more accurate…

A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…

Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…