Related papers: Reputation Effects under Short Memories

A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his myopic opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in every period. I characterize the set of…

I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her…

I study a social learning model in which the object to learn is a strategic player's endogenous actions rather than an exogenous state. A patient seller faces a sequence of buyers and decides whether to build a reputation for supplying high…

We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player facing a sequence of short-run opponents makes an announcement about their intended action after observing an…

A patient firm interacts with a sequence of consumers. The firm is either an honest type who supplies high quality and never erases its records, or an opportunistic type who chooses what quality to supply and may erase its records at a low…

We study reputation formation where a long-run player repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions. Short-run players observe the long-run player's past actions but not her past signals. The long-run player can thus develop a…

We study the economic interactions among sellers and buyers in online markets. In such markets, buyers have limited information about the product quality, but can observe the sellers' reputations which depend on their past transaction…

We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We…

I revisit the canonical reputation framework in which a long-lived player interacts with a sequence of short-lived opponents and may be either strategic or a commitment type who always plays the same, possibly mixed, action. I depart by…

We analyze a reputational bargaining game in which a central player negotiates simultaneously with two peripheral players. Each player is either rational or a commitment type who never concedes and insists on a fixed share, and concessions…

I study reputation formation in repeated games where player actions endogenously determine the probability the game permanently ends. Permanent exit can render reputation useless even to a patient long-lived player whose actions are…

We analyze a two-period, two-market chain-store game in which an incumbent's conduct in one market is only sometimes seen in the other. This partial observability generates reputational spillovers across markets. We characterize equilibrium…

As a firm varies the price of a product, consumers exhibit reference effects, making purchase decisions based not only on the prevailing price but also the product's price history. We consider the problem of learning such behavioral…

A buyer and a seller bargain over the price of an object. Both players can build reputations for being obstinate by offering the same price over time. Before players bargain, the seller decides whether to adopt a new technology that can…

We examine the implications of consumer privacy when preferences today depend upon past consumption choices, and consumers shop from different sellers in each period. Although consumers are ex ante identical, their initial consumption…

We study a model of social learning from reviews where customers are computationally limited and make purchases based on reading only the first few reviews displayed by the platform. Under this limited attention, we establish that the…

Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…

We study dynamic reputation in a social-learning environment where only purchase decisions are observable. A long-lived seller posts a fixed price and chooses costly product quality in each period before interacting with short-lived buyers…

We study two-sided reputational bargaining with opportunities to issue an ultimatum -- threats to force dispute resolution. Each player is either a justified type, who never concedes and issues an ultimatum whenever an opportunity arrives,…

We present a simple game model where agents with different memory lengths compete for finite resources. We show by simulation and analytically that an instability exists at a critical memory length, and as a result, different memory lengths…