Related papers: Securing Optimized Code Against Power Side Channel…
To meet the ever-growing need for performance in silicon devices, SoC providers have been increasingly relying on software-hardware cooperation. By controlling hardware resources such as power or clock management from the software,…
The dependence of power-consumption on the processed data is a known vulnerability of CMOS circuits, resulting in side channels which can be exploited by power-based side channel attacks (SCAs). These attacks can extract sensitive…
When implementing secure software, developers must ensure certain requirements, such as the erasure of secret data after its use and execution in real time. Such requirements are not explicitly captured by the C language and could…
Cryptographic computations are fundamental to modern computing, ensuring data confidentiality and integrity. However, these operations are highly vulnerable to power side-channel attacks that exploit variations in power consumption to leak…
Side channel attacks have emerged as a serious threat to the security of both networked and embedded systems -- in particular through the implementations of cryptographic operations. Side channels can be difficult to model formally, but…
Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) presents a clear threat to privacy and security in modern computing systems. The vast majority of communications are secured through cryptographic algorithms. These algorithms are often provably-secure from a…
Background and Objectives: Substitution-box (s-box) is one of the essential components to create confusion and nonlinear properties in cryptography. To strengthening a cipher against various attacks, including side channel attacks, these…
Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested by…
With the advancement of technology in the last few decades, leading to the widespread availability of miniaturized sensors and internet-connected things (IoT), security of electronic devices has become a top priority. Side-channel attack…
Power side-channel attacks, which can deduce secret data via statistical analysis, have become a serious threat. Masking is an effective countermeasure for reducing the statistical dependence between secret data and side-channel…
We present a kernel-level infrastructure that allows system-wide detection of malicious applications attempting to exploit cache-based side-channel attacks to break the process confinement enforced by standard operating systems. This…
Secure applications implement software protections against side-channel and physical attacks. Such protections are meaningful at machine code or micro-architectural level, but they typically do not carry observable semantics at source…
Side channel attacks steal secret keys by cleverly leveraging information leakages and can, therefore, break encryption. Thus, detection and mitigation of side channel attacks is a very important problem, but the solutions proposed in the…
Side-channel attacks on microprocessors, like the RISC-V, exhibit security vulnerabilities that lead to several design challenges. Hence, it is imperative to study and analyze these security vulnerabilities comprehensively. In this paper,…
GPUs are increasingly being used in security applications, especially for accelerating encryption/decryption. While GPUs are an attractive platform in terms of performance, the security of these devices raises a number of concerns. One…
Timing side channels pose a significant threat to the security and privacy of software applications. We propose an approach for mitigating this problem by decreasing the strength of the side channels as measured by entropy-based objectives,…
In his keynote speech at CHES 2004, Kocher advocated that side-channel attacks were an illustration that formal cryptography was not as secure as it was believed because some assumptions (e.g., no auxiliary information is available during…
Power side-channel attacks exploit the dynamic power consumption of cryptographic operations to leak sensitive information of encryption hardware. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct power side-channel analysis for assessing the…
Microarchitectural attacks exploit the abstraction gap between the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) and how instructions are actually executed by processors to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of a system. To secure systems…