Related papers: Quantitative Verification of Opacity Properties in…
In this paper, we consider the problem of verifying pre-opacity for discrete-time control systems. Pre-opacity is an important information-flow security property that secures the intention of a system to execute some secret behaviors in the…
Qualitative opacity of a secret is a security property, which means that a system trajectory satisfying the secret is observation-equivalent to a trajectory violating the secret. In this paper, we study how to synthesize a control policy…
Probabilistic model checking is a widely used formal verification technique to automatically verify qualitative and quantitative properties for probabilistic models. However, capturing such systems, writing corresponding properties, and…
Language-based information flow security aims to decide whether an action-observable program can unintentionally leak confidential information if it has the authority to access confidential data. Recent concerns about declassification…
Software Transactional Memory (STM) algorithms provide programmers with a synchronisation mechanism for concurrent access to shared variables. Basically, programmers can specify transactions (reading from and writing to shared state) which…
We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each…
We employ Clarkson and Schneider's "hyperproperties" to classify various verification problems of quantitative information flow. The results of this paper unify and extend the previous results on the hardness of checking and inferring…
Using probabilities in the formal-methods-based development of safety-critical software has quickened interests in academia and industry. We address this area by our model-driven engineering method for reactive systems SPACE and its…
In this paper, we investigate a class of information-flow security properties called opacity in partial-observed discrete-event systems. Roughly speaking, a system is said to be opaque if the intruder, which is modeled by a passive…
Opacity is a property that captures security concerns in cyber-physical systems and its verification plays a significant role. This paper investigates the verifications of K-step and infinite-step weak and strong opacity for partially…
Explainable systems expose information about why certain observed effects are happening to the agents interacting with them. We argue that this constitutes a positive flow of information that needs to be specified, verified, and balanced…
We present a monitoring approach for verifying systems at runtime. Our approach targets systems whose components communicate with the monitors over unreliable channels, where messages can be delayed or lost. In contrast to prior works,…
Monitorability delineates what properties can be verified at runtime. Although many monitorability definitions exist, few are defined explicitly in terms of the guarantees provided by monitors, i.e., the computational entities carrying out…
We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural…
Hyperproperties allow one to specify properties of systems that inherently involve not single executions of the system, but several of them at once: observational determinism and non-inference are two examples of such properties used to…
To analyse cryptographic properties of distributed systems in a systematic way, a formal theory is required. In this paper, we present a theory that allows (1) to specify distributed systems formally, (2) to verify their cryptographic wrt.…
Techniques for runtime verification often utilise specification languages that are (i) reasonably expressive, and (ii) relatively abstract (i.e. they operate on a level of abstraction that separates them from the system being monitored).…
Security protocols are concurrent processes that communicate using cryptography with the aim of achieving various security properties. Recent work on their formal verification has brought procedures and tools for deciding trace equivalence…
Classical opacity theory for discrete-event systems relies strictly on observable event sequences, fundamentally failing to capture security breaches in hybrid architectures where an attacker exploits both classical traces and localized…
There has been considerable work on reasoning about the strategic ability of agents under imperfect information. However, existing logics such as Probabilistic Strategy Logic are unable to express properties relating to information…