Related papers: A poor agent and subsidy: an investigation through…
This article introduces a model for interacting vertex-reinforced random walks, each taking values on a complete sub-graph of a locally finite undirected graph. The transition probability for a walk to a given vertex depends on the…
The Schelling model of segregation was introduced in economics to show how micro-motives can influence macro-behavior. Agents on a lattice have two colors and try to move to a different location if the number of their neighbors with a…
Different agents need to make a prediction. They observe identical data, but have different models: they predict using different explanatory variables. We study which agent believes they have the best predictive ability -- as measured by…
Two kinetic exchange models are proposed to explore the dynamics of closed economic markets characterized by random exchanges, saving propensities, and collective transactions. Model I simulates a system where individual transactions occur…
We significantly extend our earlier variant of the Schelling model, incorporating a neighborhood Potential function as well as an agent wealth gain function to study the long term evolution of the economic status of neighborhoods in cities.…
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, resource limitations are usually assumed just to provide a finite population size. Recently, however, agent-based models have pointed out that resource limitation may modify the original…
Large collections of coupled, heterogeneous agents can manifest complex dynamical behavior presenting difficulties for simulation and analysis. However, if the collective dynamics lie on a low-dimensional manifold then the original…
We study one-sided matching problems where $n$ agents have preferences over $m$ objects and each of them need to be assigned to at most one object. Most work on such problems assume that the agents only have ordinal preferences and usually…
Coordination is often critical to forming prosocial behaviors -- behaviors that increase the overall sum of rewards received by all agents in a multi-agent game. However, state of the art reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from…
In this paper we extend the series of our studies on the properties of an interacting particle model for market microstructure. In our earlier work we defined a Markov process on the majority opinion of the agents, obtained the transition…
Large language model (LLM)-driven agents are emerging as a powerful new paradigm for solving complex problems. Despite the empirical success of these practices, a theoretical framework to understand and unify their macroscopic dynamics…
We address the issue of the dynamics of wealth accumulation and economic crisis triggered by extreme inequality, attempting to stick to most possibly intrinsic assumptions. Our general framework is that of pure or modified multiplicative…
A discrete implementation on a lattice of the Active Walker Model is presented. After the model's validity is shown in simple simulations, more complex simulations of walkers passing consecutively a lattice from an arbitrary starting point…
How do individuals accumulate wealth as they interact economically? We outline the consequences of a simple microscopic model in which repeated pairwise exchanges of assets between individuals build the wealth distribution of a population.…
We study the behaviour of a Schelling-class system in which a fraction $f$ of spatially-fixed switching agents is introduced. This new model allows for multiple interpretations, including: (i) random, non-preferential allocation…
Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…
An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality.…
We present a modeling framework for dynamical and bursty contact networks made of agents in social interaction. We consider agents' behavior at short time scales, in which the contact network is formed by disconnected cliques of different…
We study a model of wealth dynamics [Bouchaud and M\'ezard 2000, \emph{Physica A} \textbf{282}, 536] which mimics transactions among economic agents. The outcomes of the model are shown to depend strongly on the topological properties of…
Commonly, the strategy revision phase in evolutionary games relies on payoff comparison. Namely, agents compare their payoff with the opponent, assessing whether changing strategy can be potentially convenient. Even tiny payoff differences…