Related papers: DF-SCA: Dynamic Frequency Side Channel Attacks are…
Over the past years, literature has shown that attacks exploiting the microarchitecture of modern processors pose a serious threat to the privacy of mobile phone users. This is because applications leave distinct footprints in the…
Screaming-channel attacks enable Electromagnetic (EM) Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) at larger distances due to higher EM leakage energies than traditional SCAs, relaxing the requirement of close access to the victim. This attack can be…
We present the first acoustic side-channel attack that recovers what users type on the virtual keyboard of their touch-screen smartphone or tablet. When a user taps the screen with a finger, the tap generates a sound wave that propagates on…
The side-channel attack is an attack method based on the information gained about implementations of computer systems, rather than weaknesses in algorithms. Information about system characteristics such as power consumption, electromagnetic…
In the past decade, the cyber-crime related to mobile devices has increased. Mobile devices, especially the ones running on Android operating system are particularly interesting to malware creators, as the users often keep the biggest…
With the improvements in computing technologies, edge devices in the Internet-of-Things have become more complex. The enabler technology for these complex systems are powerful application core processors with operating system support, such…
With the advancement of technology in the last few decades, leading to the widespread availability of miniaturized sensors and internet-connected things (IoT), security of electronic devices has become a top priority. Side-channel attack…
Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks aim to infer which websites a user is visiting by analyzing traffic patterns, thereby compromising user anonymity. Although this technique has been demonstrated to be effective in controlled experimental…
Website fingerprinting attack (WFA) aims to deanonymize the website a user is visiting through anonymous networks channels (e.g., Tor). Despite of remarkable progress in the past years, most existing methods make implicitly a couple of…
Multi-process concurrency is effective in improving program efficiency and maximizing CPU utilization. The correct execution of concurrency is ensured by the mutual exclusion and synchronization mechanism (MESM) that manages the shared…
The deep learning revolution has been enabled in large part by GPUs, and more recently accelerators, which make it possible to carry out computationally demanding training and inference in acceptable times. As the size of machine learning…
Power side-channel analysis (SCA) has been of immense interest to most embedded designers to evaluate the physical security of the system. This work presents profiling-based cross-device power SCA attacks using deep learning techniques on…
The power consumption of a microprocessor is a huge channel for information leakage. While the most popular exploitation of this channel is to recover cryptographic keys from embedded devices, other applications such as mobile app…
Side Channel Analysis attacks take advantage of the information leaked from the implementations of cryptographic algorithms. In this paper we describe two key revealing methods which are based on machine learning algorithms: K-means and…
Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested by…
Modern computers rely on USB and HDMI ports for connecting external peripherals and display devices. Despite their built-in security measures, these ports remain susceptible to passive power-based side-channel attacks. This paper presents a…
In the recent past, we have witnessed the shift towards attacks on the microarchitectural CPU level. In particular, cache side-channels play a predominant role as they allow an attacker to exfiltrate secret information by exploiting the CPU…
Modern optical mouse sensors, with their advanced precision and high responsiveness, possess an often overlooked vulnerability: they can be exploited for side-channel attacks. This paper introduces Mic-E-Mouse, the first-ever side-channel…
Physical side-channel attacks can compromise the security of integrated circuits. Most physical side-channel attacks (e.g., power or electromagnetic) exploit the dynamic behavior of a chip, typically manifesting as changes in current…
We present a software approach to mitigate access-driven side-channel attacks that leverage last-level caches (LLCs) shared across cores to leak information between security domains (e.g., tenants in a cloud). Our approach dynamically…