Related papers: Optimal Private Payoff Manipulation against Commit…

We study online learning in Bayesian Stackelberg games, where a leader repeatedly interacts with a follower whose unknown private type is independently drawn at each round from an unknown probability distribution. The goal is to design…

We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…

A sender persuades a strategically naive decisionmaker (DM) by committing privately to an experiment. Sender's choice of experiment is unknown to the DM, who must form her posterior beliefs nonparametrically by applying some learning rule…

An insider is a team member who covertly deviates from the team's optimal collaborative strategy to pursue a private objective while still appearing cooperative. Such an insider may initially behave cooperatively but later switch to selfish…

This study raises and addresses the problem of time-delayed feedback in learning in games. Because learning in games assumes that multiple agents independently learn their strategies, a discrepancy in optimization often emerges among the…

Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…

According to the evolutionary game theory principle, a strategy representing a higher payoff can spread among competitors. But there are cases when a player consistently overestimates or underestimates her own payoff, which undermines…

Coordination facilitation and efficient decision-making are two essential components of successful leadership. In this paper, we take an informational approach and investigate how followers' information impacts coordination and efficient…

In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…

Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…

We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms." A recommender mechanism is one that does not have the power to…

Imitation sometimes achieves success in multi-agent situations even though it is very simple. In game theory, success of imitation has been characterized by unbeatability against other agents. Previous studies specified conditions under…

In most studies regarding evolutionary game dynamics, the effective payoff, a quantity that translates the payoff derived from game interactions into reproductive success, is usually assumed to be a specific function of the payoff.…

An insider is defined as a team member who covertly deviates from the team's optimal collaborative control strategy in pursuit of a private objective, while maintaining an outward appearance of cooperation. Such insider threats can severely…

Zero-determinant strategies are memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relations between expected payoffs of players. Recently, the concept of zero-determinant strategies was extended to the class of…

Learning algorithms are often used to make decisions in sequential decision-making environments. In multi-agent settings, the decisions of each agent can affect the utilities/losses of the other agents. Therefore, if an agent is good at…

We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits, in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always higher than in the benchmark case where experiment outcomes are publicly…

How does information regarding an adversary's intentions affect optimal system design? This paper addresses this question in the context of graphical coordination games where an adversary can indirectly influence the behavior of agents by…

In the inference attacks studied in Quantitative Information Flow (QIF), the attacker typically tries to interfere with the system in the attempt to increase its leakage of secret information. The defender, on the other hand, typically…