Related papers: Stackelberg Risk Preference Design
Bandits with preference feedback present a powerful tool for optimizing unknown target functions when only pairwise comparisons are allowed instead of direct value queries. This model allows for incorporating human feedback into online…
As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg game: the decision-maker "leads" in the…
In this paper, we consider a class of stochastic optimal control problems with risk constraints that are expressed as bounded probabilities of failure for particular initial states. We present here a martingale approach that diffuses a risk…
In this paper, the two-player leader-follower game with private inputs for feedback Stackelberg strategy is considered. In particular, the follower shares its measurement information with the leader except its historical control inputs…
Machine learning systems embed preferences either in training losses or through post-processing of calibrated predictions. Applying information design methods from Strack and Yang (2024), this paper provides decision problem agnostic…
We consider a scenario where a retailer can set different prices for different consumers in a smart grid. The retailer's objective is to maximize the revenue, minimize the operating cost, and maximize the consumer's welfare. The retailer…
In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic Stackelberg game with two players, a leader and a follower. The follower has access to the state of the system while the leader does not. Assuming that the players act in their respective…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a leader and an infinite number of followers. The leader and the followers each observe types privately that evolve as conditionally independent controlled Markov…
Game theory has traditionally had a relatively limited view of risk based on how a player's expected reward is impacted by the uncertainty of the actions of other players. Recently, a new game-theoretic approach provides a more holistic…
A Stackelberg Vertex Cover game is played on an undirected graph $\mathcal{G}$ where some of the vertices are under the control of a \emph{leader}. The remaining vertices are assigned a fixed weight. The game is played in two stages. First,…
We consider bilevel linear problems, where some parameters are stochastic, and the leader has to decide in a here-and-now fashion, while the follower has complete information. In this setting, the leader's outcome can be modeled by a random…
In this technical note, we consider the linear-quadratic time-inconsistent mean-field type leader-follower Stackelberg differential game with an adapted open-loop information structure. The objective functionals of the leader and the…
The pursuit of sustainability motivates microgrids that depend on distributed resources to produce more renewable energies. An efficient operation and planning relies on a holistic framework that takes into account the interdependent…
We present a method for active inference with partial observations in stochastic systems through incentive design, also known as the leader-follower game. Consider a leader agent who aims to infer a follower agent's type given a finite set…
Engineering design problems are often modeled as multi-objective optimization tasks in which a scalarized utility function selects an optimal design from the Pareto set. In practice, preferences are imperfectly known, so uncertainty in the…
In order to balance the interests of integrated energy operator (IEO) and users, a novel Stackelberg game-based optimization framework is proposed for the optimal scheduling of integrated demand response (IDR)-enabled integrated energy…
Shared control allows the human driver to collaborate with an assistive driving system while retaining the ability to make decisions and take control if necessary. However, human-vehicle teaming and planning are challenging due to…
Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is…
Information asymmetry between the Distribution System Operator (DSO) and Distributed Energy Resource Aggregators (DERAs) obstructs designing effective incentives for voltage regulation. To capture this effect, we employ a Stackelberg…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…