Related papers: Rejection-proof Kidney Exchange Mechanisms
We study the parameterized complexity of a recently introduced multi-agent variant of the Kidney Exchange problem. Given a directed graph $G$ and integers $d$ and $k$, the standard problem asks whether $G$ contains a packing of…
The seminal work of Roth, S\"onmez, & \"Unver shows that the Edmonds-Gallai structure theorem for non-bipartite matching can be leveraged to yield a randomized algorithm to match patient-donor pairs in kidney exchange with extraordinarily…
Kidney exchange is a barter market where patients trade willing but medically incompatible donors. These trades occur via cycles, where each patient-donor pair both gives and receives a kidney, and via chains, which begin with an altruistic…
We design a flexible algorithm that exploits deceased donor kidneys to initiate chains of living donor kidney paired donations, combining deceased and living donor allocation mechanisms to improve the quantity and quality of kidney…
Kidney donations from living donors form an attractive alternative to long waiting times on a list for a post-mortem donation. However, even if a living donor for a given patient is found, the donor's kidney might not meet the patient's…
Motivated by kidney exchange, we study a stochastic cycle and chain packing problem, where we aim to identify structures in a directed graph to maximize the expectation of matched edge weights. All edges are subject to failure, and the…
The burgeoning need for kidney transplantation mandates immediate attention. Mismatch of deceased donor-recipient kidney leads to post-transplant death. To ensure ideal kidney donor-recipient match and minimize post-transplant deaths, the…
Relatives and friends of an end-stage renal disease patient who offer to donate a kidney are often found to be incompatible with their intended recipients. Kidney paired donation matches one patient and his incompatible donor with another…
This paper addresses the problem of maximizing the expected size of a matching in the case of unreliable vertices and/or edges. The assumption is that upon failure, remaining vertices that have not been matched may be subject to a new…
The efficient and fair allocation of limited resources is a classical problem in economics and computer science. In kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and donors…
In the query-commit problem we are given a graph where edges have distinct probabilities of existing. It is possible to query the edges of the graph, and if the queried edge exists then its endpoints are irrevocably matched. The goal is to…
Balancing fairness and efficiency in resource allocation is a classical economic and computational problem. The price of fairness measures the worst-case loss of economic efficiency when using an inefficient but fair allocation rule; for…
A kidney transplant can improve the life expectancy and quality of life of patients with end-stage renal failure. Even more patients could be helped with a transplant if the rate of kidneys that are discarded and not transplanted could be…
Motivated by the real-world problem of international kidney exchange (IKEP), recent literature introduced a generalized transferable utility matching game featuring a partition of the vertex set of a graph into players, and analyzed its…
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…
We study an elementary path problem which appears in the pricing step of a column generation scheme solving the kidney exchange problem. The latter aims at finding exchanges of donations in a pool of patients and donors of kidney…
Modern kidney placement incorporates several intelligent recommendation systems which exhibit social discrimination due to biases inherited from training data. Although initial attempts were made in the literature to study algorithmic…
Kidney exchange programs have substantially increased transplantation rates but also raise critical concerns about fairness in organ allocation. We propose a novel framework leveraging Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to evaluate multiple…
Fair regression methods have the potential to mitigate societal bias concerns in health care, but there has been little work on penalized fair regression when multiple groups experience such bias. We propose a general regression framework…
In this paper we consider the pairwise kidney exchange game. This game naturally appears in situations that some service providers benefit from pairwise allocations on a network, such as the kidney exchanges between hospitals. Ashlagi et…