Related papers: Polynomial Voting Rules
We consider synchronous iterative voting, where voters are given the opportunity to strategically choose their ballots depending on the outcome deduced from the previous collective choices.We propose two settings for synchronous iterative…
In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate $n$ votes i.i.d. according to a…
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of this setting, in which voters can support multiple parties by…
We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political elections,…
We focus on a generalization of the classic Minisum approval voting rule, introduced by Barrot and Lang (2016), and referred to as Conditional Minisum (CMS), for multi-issue elections with preferential dependencies. Under this rule, voters…
Decentralization is a foundational principle of permissionless blockchains, with consensus mechanisms serving a critical role in its realization. This study quantifies the decentralization of consensus mechanisms in proof-of-stake (PoS)…
In this paper, we study the problem of Participatory Budgeting (PB) with approval ballots, inspired by Multi-Winner Voting schemes. We present generalized preference aggregation methods for participatory budgeting, especially for finding…
Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in…
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on a set of projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting where voters report ordinal preferences over projects and have (possibly) asymmetric…
Designing private voting rules is an important and pressing problem for trustworthy democracy. In this paper, under the framework of differential privacy, we propose a novel famliy of randomized voting rules based on the well-known…
The median voter theorem has long been the default model of voter behavior and candidate choice. While contemporary work on the distribution of political opinion has emphasized polarization and an increasing gap between the "left" and the…
We study a generalization of the voter model on complex networks, focusing on the scaling of mean exit time. Previous work has defined the voter model in terms of an initially chosen node and a randomly chosen neighbor, which makes it…
We consider a social choice problem where only a small number of people out of a large population are sufficiently available or motivated to vote. A common solution to increase participation is to allow voters use a proxy, that is, transfer…
Several rules for social choice are examined from a unifying point of view that looks at them as procedures for revising a system of degrees of belief in accordance with certain specified logical constraints. Belief is here a social…
In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree…
Citizen-focused democratic processes where participants deliberate on alternatives and then vote to make the final decision are increasingly popular today. While the computational social choice literature has extensively investigated voting…
Criteria for a good voting system have been given particularly careful scrutiny in recent years, with general agreement that the core values are fair results, voter power and choice, and local representation. This paper reexamines the basic…
In many machine learning scenarios, looking for the best classifier that fits a particular dataset can be very costly in terms of time and resources. Moreover, it can require deep knowledge of the specific domain. We propose a new technique…
Scoring systems are an extremely important class of election systems. A length-$m$ (so-called) scoring vector applies only to $m$-candidate elections. To handle general elections, one must use a family of vectors, one per length. The most…
The core of a blockchain network is its consensus algorithm. Starting with the Proof-of-Work, there have been various versions of consensus algorithms, such as Proof-of-Stake (PoS), Proof-of-Authority (PoA), and Practical Byzantine Fault…