Related papers: Withholding Verifiable Information
Finite-player dynamic games with dispersed private information are difficult because actions both move payoffs and reshape what opponents learn, generating hierarchies of beliefs about beliefs. This paper provides a recursive representation…
We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…
Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure…
The spread of disinformation poses a significant threat to societal well-being. We analyze this phenomenon using an evolutionary game theory model of the sender-receiver game, where senders aim to mislead receivers and receivers aim to…
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…
In this work we apply methods from cryptography to enable any number of mutually distrusting players to implement broad classes of mediated equilibria of strategic games without the need for trusted mediation. Our implementation makes use…
We study a repeated sender-receiver game where inspections are public but the sender's action is hidden unless inspected. A detected deception ends the relationship or triggers a finite punishment. We show the public state is one…
We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a…
We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…
We consider a class of pursuit-evasion differential games in which the evader has continuous access to the pursuer's location, but not vice-versa. There is an immobile sensor (e.g., a ground radar station) that can sense the evader's…
We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations…
We investigate the increasingly important and common game-solving setting where we do not have an explicit description of the game but only oracle access to it through gameplay, such as in financial or military simulations and computer…
Quantum entanglement has been recently demonstrated as a useful resource in conflicting interest games of incomplete information between two players, Alice and Bob [Pappa et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 020401 (2015)]. General setting for…
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…
We investigate a linear quadratic stochastic zero-sum game where two players lobby a political representative to invest in a wind turbine farm. Players are time-inconsistent because they discount performance with a non-constant rate. Our…
This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…
We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is…
In competitive games with private objectives, actions can reveal information about hidden parameters. Quantifying such information revelation, however, is substantially more challenging, since it depends not only on the opponent's hidden…
We frame dynamic persuasion in a partial observation stochastic control Leader-Follower game with an ergodic criterion. The Receiver controls the dynamics of a multidimensional unobserved state process. Information is provided to the…
We study a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a decision-maker. The decision-maker verifies these forecasts using a calibration test based on past data. How should the expert send forecasts to maximize her payoff…