Related papers: The Power of Regularization in Solving Extensive-F…

Sparse iterative methods, in particular first-order methods, are known to be among the most effective in solving large-scale two-player zero-sum extensive-form games. The convergence rates of these methods depend heavily on the properties…

Most of the literature on learning in games has focused on the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Much less is known about the convergence of no-regret learning algorithms in dynamic multiagent…

The solution to empirical risk minimization with $f$-divergence regularization (ERM-$f$DR) is extended to constrained optimization problems, establishing conditions for equivalence between the solution and constraints. A dual formulation of…

We study the problem of no-regret learning algorithms for general monotone and smooth games and their last-iterate convergence properties. Specifically, we investigate the problem under bandit feedback and strongly uncoupled dynamics, which…

In this paper, we propose a provably convergent and practical framework for multi-objective reinforcement learning with max-min criterion. From a game-theoretic perspective, we reformulate max-min multi-objective reinforcement learning as a…

Motivated by alternating learning dynamics in two-player games, a recent work by Cevher et al.(2024) shows that $o(\sqrt{T})$ alternating regret is possible for any $T$-round adversarial Online Linear Optimization (OLO) problem, and left as…

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CRF) is a fundamental and effective technique for solving Imperfect Information Games (IIG). However, the original CRF algorithm only works for discrete state and action spaces, and the resulting strategy…

Extensive-Form Game (EFG) represents a fundamental model for analyzing sequential interactions among multiple agents and the primary challenge to solve it lies in mitigating sample complexity. Existing research indicated that Double Oracle…

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…

We develop provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. To incorporate function approximation, we consider a family of Markov games where the reward…

We introduce Cautious Optimism, a framework for substantially faster regularized learning in general games. Cautious Optimism, as a variant of Optimism, adaptively controls the learning pace in a dynamic, non-monotone manner to accelerate…

First-order methods (FOMs) are arguably the most scalable algorithms for equilibrium computation in large extensive-form games. To operationalize these methods, a distance-generating function, acting as a regularizer for the strategy space,…

Recently, much work has been done on extending the scope of online learning and incremental stochastic optimization algorithms. In this paper we contribute to this effort in two ways: First, based on a new regret decomposition and a…

The literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding predominantly focuses on single games or their repeated play. Nevertheless, numerous real-world scenarios feature playing a game sampled from a distribution of similar, but not identical…

The solution to empirical risk minimization with $f$-divergence regularization (ERM-$f$DR) is presented under mild conditions on $f$. Under such conditions, the optimal measure is shown to be unique. Examples of the solution for particular…

Offline multi-agent reinforcement learning in general-sum settings is challenged by the distribution shift between logged datasets and target equilibrium policies. While standard methods rely on manual pessimistic penalties, we demonstrate…

While extensive-form games (EFGs) can be converted into normal-form games (NFGs), doing so comes at the cost of an exponential blowup of the strategy space. So, progress on NFGs and EFGs has historically followed separate tracks, with the…

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a cornerstone technique for post-training large language models. While most existing approaches rely on the reverse KL-regularization, recent empirical studies have begun…

We establish the first uncoupled learning algorithm that attains $O(n \log^2 d \log T)$ per-player regret in multi-player general-sum games, where $n$ is the number of players, $d$ is the number of actions available to each player, and $T$…

In this paper we study two-player bilinear zero-sum games with constrained strategy spaces. An instance of natural occurrences of such constraints is when mixed strategies are used, which correspond to a probability simplex constraint. We…