Related papers: Equilibria in Network Constrained Energy Markets
We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete \`a la Cournot, by…
We consider a market in which capacity-constrained generators compete in scalar-parameterized supply functions to serve an inelastic demand spread throughout a transmission constrained power network. The market clears according to a…
We study the role of a market maker (or market operator) in a transmission constrained electricity market. We model the market as a one-shot networked Cournot competition where generators supply quantity bids and load serving entities…
As the number of prosumers with distributed energy resources (DERs) grows, the conventional centralized operation scheme may suffer from conflicting interests, privacy concerns, and incentive inadequacy. In this paper, we propose an energy…
Uncertainty in the output power of large-scale wind power plants (WPPs) can face the electricity market players with undesirable profit variations. Market players can hedge themselves against these risks by participating in forward…
Cournot competition is a fundamental economic model that represents firms competing in a single market of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize its utility---a function of the production cost as well as market price of the…
The advent of intelligent agents who produce and consume energy by themselves has led the smart grid into the era of "prosumer", offering the energy system and customers a unique opportunity to revaluate/trade their spot energy via a…
Nash equilibrium is a common solution concept that captures strategic interaction in electricity market analysis. However, it requires a fundamental but impractical assumption that all market participants are fully rational, implying…
Electricity markets differ in their ability to meet power imbalances in short notice in a controlled fashion. Relatively flexible markets have the ability to ramp up (or down) power flows across interties without compromising their ability…
Competition has been introduced in the electricity markets with the goal of reducing prices and improving efficiency. The basic idea which stays behind this choice is that, in competitive markets, a greater quantity of the good is exchanged…
We study Cournot competition among firms in a networked marketplace that is centrally managed by a market maker. In particular, we study a situation in which a market maker facilitates trade between geographically separate markets via a…
We consider a variant of Cournot competition, where multiple firms allocate the same amount of resource across multiple markets. We prove that the game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), which is symmetric and is…
This paper proposes a novel energy sharing mechanism for prosumers who can produce and consume. Different from most existing works, the role of individual prosumer as a seller or buyer in our model is endogenously determined. Several…
We develop a stochastic equilibrium model for an electricity market with asymmetric renewable energy forecasts. In our setting, market participants optimize their profits using public information about a conditional expectation of energy…
In this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of…
We consider the scenario where $N$ utilities strategically bid for electricity in the day-ahead market and balance the mismatch between the committed supply and actual demand in the real-time market, with uncertainty in demand and local…
We propose a method to design a decentralized energy market which guarantees individual rationality (IR) in expectation, in the presence of system-level grid constraints. We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problem subject to…
We consider a network of prosumers involved in peer-to-peer energy exchanges, with differentiation price preferences on the trades with their neighbors, and we analyze two market designs: (i) a centralized market, used as a benchmark, where…
The introduction of aggregator structures has proven effective in bringing fairness to energy resource allocation by negotiating for more resources and economic surplus on behalf of users. This paper extends the fair energy resource…
Spot electricity markets are considered under a Game-Theoretic framework, where risk averse players submit orders to the market clearing mechanism to maximise their own utility. Consistent with the current practice in Europe, the market…