Related papers: Learning to Infer Structures of Network Games
Deploying machine learning models in production may allow adversaries to infer sensitive information about training data. There is a vast literature analyzing different types of inference risks, ranging from membership inference to…
In Social Networks, it is often interesting to study type of networks formed, its efficiency with respect to social objective and which networks are stable. Many work have already been there in this area. Players in network formation game…
We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…
Networks are one of the most powerful structures for modeling problems in the real world. Downstream machine learning tasks defined on networks have the potential to solve a variety of problems. With link prediction, for instance, one can…
In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…
Many economic interventions are designed as marginal changes in incentives. Yet in environments shaped by coordination, institutional persistence, and path dependence, such reforms often leave behavior largely unchanged. This paper studies…
We study the strategic formation of multi-layer networks, where each layer represents a different type of relationship between the nodes in the network and is designed to maximize some utility that depends on the topology of that layer and…
We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing…
We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…
In distributed systems, knowledge of the network structure of the connections among the unitary components is often a requirement for an accurate prediction of the emerging collective dynamics. However, in many real-world situations, one…
Many real-world networks are so large that we must simplify their structure before we can extract useful information about the systems they represent. As the tools for doing these simplifications proliferate within the network literature,…
We establish a network formation game for the Internet's Autonomous System (AS) interconnection topology. The game includes different types of players, accounting for the heterogeneity of ASs in the Internet. We incorporate reliability…
We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different…
In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…
We consider the problem of learning to exploit learning algorithms through repeated interactions in games. Specifically, we focus on the case of repeated two player, finite-action games, in which an optimizer aims to steer a no-regret…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social behavior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local network…
The main problem we address in this paper is whether function determines form when a society of agents organizes itself for some purpose or whether the organizing method is more important than the functionality in determining the structure…
Evolutionary game theory predicts that cooperation in social dilemma games is promoted when agents are connected as a network. However, when networks are fixed over time, humans do not necessarily show enhanced mutual cooperation. Here we…
Many relationships requiring mutual agreement between pairs of actors produce observable networks that are symmetric and undirected. Nevertheless the unobserved, asymmetric network is often of primary scientific interest. We propose a…