Related papers: Plurality Veto: A Simple Voting Rule Achieving Opt…
We consider a social choice setting with agents that are partitioned into disjoint groups, and have metric preferences over a set of alternatives. Our goal is to choose a single alternative aiming to optimize various objectives that are…
In this paper we address the problem of electing a committee among a set of $m$ candidates and on the basis of the preferences of a set of $n$ voters. We consider the approval voting method in which each voter can approve as many candidates…
We consider a social choice setting in which agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space, and the cost of an agent for an alternative is the distance between the corresponding points in the space. The goal is to…
We consider a two-round election model involving $m$ voters and $n$ candidates. Each voter is endowed with a strict preference list ranking the candidates. In the first round, the candidates are partitioned into two subsets, $A$ and $B$,…
We study how electoral rules shape polarization dynamics when voters and candidates both adapt to repeated election outcomes. We introduce two geometric primitives for comparing rules under this feedback: the \emph{winner radius} $R_t =…
To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings,…
Suppose that we have $n$ agents and $n$ items which lie in a shared metric space. We would like to match the agents to items such that the total distance from agents to their matched items is as small as possible. However, instead of having…
Recent works have studied the design of algorithms for selecting representative sortition panels. However, the most central question remains unaddressed: Do these panels reflect the entire population's opinion? We present a positive answer…
We consider the matching problem in the metric distortion framework. There are $n$ agents and $n$ items occupying points in a shared metric space, and the goal is to design a matching mechanism that outputs a low-cost matching between the…
Election rules are formal processes that aggregate voters preferences, typically to select a single candidate, called the winner. Most of the election rules studied in the literature require the voters to rank the candidates from the most…
Limited Voting (LV) is an approval-based method for multi-winner elections where all ballots are required to have a same fixed size. While it appears to be used as voting method in corporate governance and has some political applications,…
We study metric distortion in distributed voting, where $n$ voters are partitioned into $k$ groups, each selecting a local representative, and a final winner is chosen from these representatives (or from the entire set of candidates). This…
In many proportional parliamentary elections, electoral thresholds (typically 3-5%) are used to promote stability and governability by preventing the election of parties with very small representation. However, these thresholds often result…
Elections and opinion polls often have many candidates, with the aim to either rank the candidates or identify a small set of winners according to voters' preferences. In practice, voters do not provide a full ranking; instead, each voter…
We consider a spatial voting model where both candidates and voters are positioned in the $d$-dimensional Euclidean space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their proximity to the voter's ideal point. We focus on the scenario where…
In many practical scenarios, a population is divided into disjoint groups for better administration, e.g., electorates into political districts, employees into departments, students into school districts, and so on. However, grouping people…
In social choice there often arises a conflict between the majority principle (the search for a candidate that is as good as possible for as many voters as possible), and the protection of minority rights (choosing a candidate that is not…
We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show…
We show that the proportional clustering problem using the Droop quota for $k = 1$ is equivalent to the $\beta$-plurality problem. We also show that the Plurality Veto rule can be used to select ($\sqrt{5} - 2$)-plurality points using only…
Voter control problems model situations in which an external agent tries toaffect the result of an election by adding or deleting the fewest number of voters. The goal of the agent is to make a specific candidate either win…