Related papers: Nash conditional independence curve
An $n$-player game $X$ in normal form can be modeled via undirected discrete graphical models where the discrete random variables represent the players and their state spaces are the set of pure strategies. There exists an edge between the…
This paper further develops the algebraic--geometric foundations of conditional independence (CI) equilibria, a refinement of dependency equilibria that integrates conditional independence relations from graphical models into strategic…
This paper is a significant step forward in understanding dependency equilibria within the framework of real algebraic geometry encompassing both pure and mixed equilibria. In alignment with Spohn's original definition of dependency…
This work investigates the intersection property of conditional independence. It states that for random variables $A,B,C$ and $X$ we have that $X$ independent of $A$ given $B,C$ and $X$ independent of $B$ given $A,C$ implies $X$ independent…
An $n$-person game is specified by $n$ tensors of the same format. We view its equilibria as points in that tensor space. Dependency equilibria are defined by linear constraints on conditional probabilities, and thus by determinantal…
It is known that the set of all correlated equilibria of an n-player non-cooperative game is a convex polytope and includes all the Nash equilibria. Further, the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of this polytope. We study the…
We investigate Spohn curves, the algebro-geometric models of totally mixed dependency equilibria for $2 \times 2$ normal-form games. These curves arise as the intersection of two quadrics in $\mathbb{P}^3$ and are generically elliptic…
We use vector bundles to study the locus of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an $n$-player game in normal form, which we call the Nash equilibrium scheme. When the payoff tensor format is balanced, we study the Nash discriminant variety,…
In this note, we study a class of deterministic finite-horizon linear-quadratic difference games with coupled affine inequality constraints involving both state and control variables. We show that the necessary conditions for the existence…
In this paper we propose and analyze a class of $N$-player stochastic games that include finite fuel stochastic games as a special case. We first derive sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibrium (NE) in the form of a verification…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
The canonical degree $C.K_X$ of an integral curve on a smooth projective surface $X$ is conjecturally bounded from above by an expression of the form $A(g-1)+B$, where $g$ is the geometric genus of $C$ and $A$, $B$ are constants depending…
In the present paper, we consider a class of two players infinite horizon differential games, with piecewise smooth costs exponentially discounted in time. Through the analysis of the value functions, we study in which cases it is possible…
We initiate the study of congestion games with variable demands where the (variable) demand has to be assigned to exactly one subset of resources. The players' incentives to use higher demands are stimulated by non-decreasing and concave…
This paper develops a model-free sequential test for conditional independence. The proposed test allows researchers to analyze an incoming i.i.d. data stream with any arbitrary dependency structure, and safely conclude whether a feature is…
Estimation of the conditional independence graph (CIG) of high-dimensional multivariate Gaussian time series from multi-attribute data is considered. Existing methods for graph estimation for such data are based on single-attribute models…
This paper studies a class of zero-sum stopping game in a regime switching model. A verification theorem as a sufficient criterion for Nash equilibriums is established based on a set of variational inequalities (VIs). Under an appropriate…
We consider the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. It is known that the problem is NP-complete in general, but tractable (i.e., in P) for special classes of graphs such as those with bounded treewidth. It…
In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…
Consider an undirected graph modeling a social network, where the vertices represent users, and the edges do connections among them. In the competitive diffusion game, each of a number of players chooses a vertex as a seed to propagate…