Related papers: Discrimination in Heterogeneous Games
Multiagent learning is a necessary yet challenging problem as multiagent systems become more prevalent and environments become more dynamic. Much of the groundbreaking work in this area draws on notable results from game theory, in…
We study a model of strategic coordination based on a class of games with incomplete information known as Global Games. Under the assumption of Poisson-distributed signals and a Gamma prior distribution on state of the system, we…
Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma…
In tacit coordination games with multiple outcomes, purely rational solution concepts, such as Nash equilibria, provide no guidance for which equilibrium to choose. Shelling's theory explains how, in these settings, humans coordinate by…
This article introduces a class of $Nash$ games among $Stackelberg$ players ($NASPs$), namely, a class of simultaneous non-cooperative games where the players solve sequential Stackelberg games. Specifically, each player solves a…
The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality it is often the case…
Schelling's famous model of segregation assumes agents of different types who would like to be located in neighborhoods having at least a certain fraction of agents of the same type. We consider natural generalizations that allow for the…
The mean field limit of large-population symmetric stochastic differential games is derived in a general setting, with and without common noise, on a finite time horizon. Minimal assumptions are imposed on equilibrium strategies, which may…
We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…
We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network that is comprised on components that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors to monitor…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
This paper explores the Nash equilibria of a variant of the Colonel Blotto game, which we call the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game. In the Colonel Blotto game, two players simultaneously distribute forces across $n$ battlefields. Within each…
We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of…
We study a class of deterministic finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum differential games where players are endowed with different kinds of controls. We assume that Player 1 uses piecewise-continuous controls, while Player 2 uses impulse…
In this paper, a multi-cluster game with high-order players is investigated. Different from the well-known multi-cluster games, the dynamics of players are taken into account in our problem. Due to the high-order dynamics of players,…
Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…
In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves…
We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…