Related papers: A Mean Field Game model for COVID-19 with human ca…
This paper is concerned with developing mean-field game models for the evolution of epidemics. Specifically, an agent's decision -- to be socially active in the midst of an epidemic -- is modeled as a mean-field game with health-related…
The paper presents the one of possible approach to model the epidemic propagation. The proposed model is based on the mean-field control inside separate groups of population, namely, suspectable (S), infected (I), removed (R) and…
We investigate an SIR model of epidemic propagation on networks in the context of mean-field games. In a real epidemic, individuals adjust their behavior depending on the epidemic level and the impact it might have on them in the future.…
We consider the spread of infectious diseases through a Mean Field Game version of a SIR compartmental model with social structure, in which individuals are grouped by their age class and interact together in different settings. In our game…
In this paper, we consider a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion in which several interacting populations evolving in $\mathbb R^d$ aim at reaching given target sets in minimal time. The movement of each agent is described by a…
The current COVID-19 pandemic has proven that proper control and prevention of infectious disease require creating and enforcing the appropriate public policies. One critical policy imposed by the policymakers is encouraging the population…
Here, we examine a mean-field game (MFG) that models the economic growth of a population of non-cooperative rational agents. In this MFG, agents are described by two state variables - the capital and consumer goods they own. Each agent…
Empirically derived continuum models of collective behavior among large populations of dynamic agents are a subject of intense study in several fields, including biology, engineering and finance. We formulate and study a mean-field game…
A simple model of corruption that takes into account the effect of the interaction of a large number of agents by both rational decision making and myopic behavior is developed. Its stationary version turns out to be a rare example of an…
We study a family of mean field games arising in modeling the behavior of strategic economic agents which move across space maximizing their utility from consumption and have the possibility to accumulate resources for production (such as…
The design of coherent and efficient policies to address infectious diseases and their consequences requires to model not only epidemics dynamics, but also individual behaviors, as the latter has a strong influence on the former. In our…
We introduce and study a model stemming from game theory for the spread of an epidemic throughout a given population. Each agent is allowed to choose an action whose value dictates to what extent they limit their social interactions, if at…
The spread of an epidemic disease and the population's collective behavioural response are deeply intertwined, influencing each other's evolution. Such a co-evolution typically has been overlooked in mathematical models, limiting their…
Given the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, it is of interest to understand how the infections spread as the combined result of measures taken by central planners (governments) and individual behavior. In this work, the spread of Covid-19 is…
We introduce a new type of Mean Field Game epidemiological models, in which subpopulations have different behavioral patterns: some are viewed as "highly rational" (choosing Nash-equilibrium long-term strategies) while others follow…
Evolution of disease in a large population is a function of the top-down policy measures from a centralized planner, as well as the self-interested decisions (to be socially active) of individual agents in a large heterogeneous population.…
In this paper, we consider a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion where agents aim to reach a closed set, called target set, in minimal time. Congestion phenomena are modeled through a constraint on the velocity of an agent that…
This paper introduces a microscopic approach to model epidemics, which can explicitly consider the consequences of individual's decisions on the spread of the disease. We first formulate a microscopic multi-agent epidemic model where every…
Motivated by models of epidemic control in large populations, we consider a Stackelberg mean field game model between a principal and a mean field of agents evolving on a finite state space. The agents play a non-cooperative game in which…
In this paper, we investigate the interaction of two populations with a large number of indistinguishable agents. The problem consists in two levels: the interaction between agents of a same population, and the interaction between the two…