Related papers: Uniqueness of Equilibria in Interactive Networks

This paper develops a mathematical framework to study signal networks, in which nodes can be active or inactive, and their activation or deactivation is driven by external signals and the states of the nodes to which they are connected via…

We study conditional independence relationships for random networks and their interplay with exchangeability. We show that, for finitely exchangeable network models, the empirical subgraph densities are maximum likelihood estimates of their…

This paper presents an unusual view of interference wireless networks based on complex system thinking. To proceed with this analysis, a literature review of the different applications of complex systems is firstly presented to illustrate…

An epidemic spreading in a network calls for a decision on the part of the network members: They should decide whether to protect themselves or not. Their decision depends on the trade-off between their perceived risk of being infected and…

We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude…

Network reliability measures the probability that a target node is reachable from a source node in an uncertain graph, i.e., a graph where every edge is associated with a probability of existence. In this paper, we investigate the novel and…

We study the incentives that agents have to invest in costly protection against cascading failures in networked systems. Applications include vaccination, computer security and airport security. Agents are connected through a network and…

Random graph models have played a dominant role in the theoretical study of networked systems. The Poisson random graph of Erdos and Renyi, in particular, as well as the so-called configuration model, have served as the starting point for…

We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Specifically, once the agents have purchased their…

Building on the line of work [DIRT15a], [DIRT15b], [NS17a], [DT17], [HLS18], [HS18] we continue the study of particle systems with singular interaction through hitting times. In contrast to the previous research, we (i) consider very…

Online social networks exert a powerful influence on public opinion. Adversaries weaponize these networks to manipulate discourse, underscoring the need for more resilient social networks. To this end, we investigate the impact of network…

Aggregated phenomena in social sciences and economics are highly dependent on the way individuals interact. To help understanding the interplay between socio-economic activities and underlying social networks, this paper studies a…

This paper studies the observability radius of network systems, which measures the robustness of a network to perturbations of the edges. We consider linear networks, where the dynamics are described by a weighted adjacency matrix, and…

We consider network games where a large number of agents interact according to a network sampled from a random network model, represented by a graphon. By exploiting previous results on convergence of such large network games to graphon…

Understanding how different networks relate to each other is key for obtaining a greater insight into complex systems. Here, we introduce an intuitive yet powerful framework to characterise the relationship between two networks comprising…

We derive the asymptotic theory of Bai (2009)'s interactive fixed effects estimator for unbalanced panels in which the source of attrition is conditionally random. For inference, we propose a method of alternating projections algorithm…

Most products are produced and sold by supply chain networks, where an interconnected network of producers and intermediaries set prices to maximize their profits. I show that there exists a unique equilibrium in a price-setting game on a…

An algorithm for $n-1$-strong-equillibrium for distributed consensus in a ring with rational agents was proposed by Afek et al. (2014). A proof of impossibility of $n-1$-strong-equillibrium for distributed consensus in every topology with…

We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a social network has a budget of effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on the contribution of the involved agents a…

Complex networks are a great tool for simulating the outcomes of different strategies used within the iterated prisoners' dilemma game. However, because the strategies themselves rely on the connection between nodes, then initial network…