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Several multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms have been proposed to optimize agents decisions. Due to the complexity of the problem, the majority of the previously developed MARL algorithms assumed agents either had some…
When solving two-player zero-sum games, multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms often create populations of agents where, at each iteration, a new agent is discovered as the best response to a mixture over the opponent…
In many settings of interest, a policy is set by one party, the leader, in order to influence the action of another party, the follower, where the follower's response is determined by some private information. A natural question to ask is,…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
Model-free reinforcement learning (RL) can be used to learn effective policies for complex tasks, such as Atari games, even from image observations. However, this typically requires very large amounts of interaction -- substantially more,…
Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) agents typically learn world models by minimizing predictive loss. However, powerful RL optimizers inevitably exploit minor model inaccuracies, leading to simulator exploitation and a reality gap…
We investigate a class of reinforcement learning dynamics where players adjust their strategies based on their actions' cumulative payoffs over time - specifically, by playing mixed strategies that maximize their expected cumulative payoff…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is increasingly used to design learning-enabled agents that interact in shared environments. However, training MARL algorithms in general-sum games remains challenging: learning dynamics can become…
This paper presents an algorithmic framework for learning robust policies in asymmetric imperfect-information games, where the joint reward could depend on the uncertain opponent type (a private information known only to the opponent itself…
We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…
Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in…
An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…
In this paper, a new population-guided parallel learning scheme is proposed to enhance the performance of off-policy reinforcement learning (RL). In the proposed scheme, multiple identical learners with their own value-functions and…
Repeated games are difficult to analyze, especially when agents play mixed strategies. We study one-memory strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma, then generalize the result to k-memory strategies in repeated games. Our result shows that…
In this paper, we establish the existence of optimal bounded memory strategy profiles in multi-player discounted sum games. We introduce a non-deterministic approach to compute optimal strategy profiles with bounded memory. Our approach can…
In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…
In addressing the challenge of exponential scaling with the number of agents we adopt a cluster-based representation to approximately solve asymmetric games of very many players. A cluster groups together agents with a similar "strategic…
Gameplay under various forms of uncertainty has been widely studied. Feldman et al. (2010) studied a particularly low-information setting in which one observes the opponent's actions but no payoffs, not even one's own, and introduced an…
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is an effective tool for controller design but can struggle with issues of robustness, failing catastrophically when the underlying system dynamics are perturbed. The Robust RL formulation tackles this by adding…
We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated,…