Related papers: Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in …

In Spatial Voting Theory, distortion is a measure of how good the winner is. It is proved that no deterministic voting mechanism can guarantee a distortion better than $3$, even for simple metrics such as a line. In this study, we wish to…

We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful, and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting…

We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragm\'en and Thiele, which elect a committee or parliament of k candidates which proportionally represents the voters. Voters provide their preferences by approving an…

Statistical algorithms are usually helping in making decisions in many aspects of our lives. But, how do we know if these algorithms are biased and commit unfair discrimination of a particular group of people, typically a minority?…

Voting algorithms have been widely used as consensus protocols in the realization of fault-tolerant systems. These algorithms are best suited for distributed systems of nodes with low computational power or heterogeneous networks, where…

Fairness in multiwinner elections is studied in varying contexts. For instance, diversity of candidates and representation of voters are both separately termed as being fair. A common denominator to ensure fairness across all such contexts…

We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…

We study a class of elections in which the input format is trichotomous and allows voters to elicit their negative feelings explicitly. In particular, we study multiwinner elections with a special proclivity to elect proportionally…

Election rules are formal processes that aggregate voters preferences, typically to select a single candidate, called the winner. Most of the election rules studied in the literature require the voters to rank the candidates from the most…

We view voting rules as classifiers that assign a winner (a class) to a profile of voters' preferences (an instance). We propose to apply techniques from formal explainability, most notably abductive and contrastive explanations, to…

We study the distortion of one-sided and two-sided matching problems on the line. In the one-sided case, $n$ agents need to be matched to $n$ items, and each agent's cost in a matching is their distance from the item they were matched to.…

Analyses of voting algorithms often overlook informational externalities shaping individual votes. For example, pre-polling information often skews voters towards candidates who may not be their top choice, but who they believe would be a…

We study fairness in social influence maximization, whereby one seeks to select seeds that spread a given information throughout a network, ensuring balanced outreach among different communities (e.g. demographic groups). In the literature,…

We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such…

Representative democracy in the United States relies on election systems that transmit votes into representatives in three key bodies: the two chambers of the federal legislature (House of Representatives and Senate) and the Electoral…

Model editing techniques, particularly task arithmetic with task vectors, offer an efficient alternative to full fine-tuning by enabling direct parameter updates through simple arithmetic operations. While this approach promises substantial…

In this paper we address the problem of electing a committee among a set of $m$ candidates and on the basis of the preferences of a set of $n$ voters. We consider the approval voting method in which each voter can approve as many candidates…

It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…

Binary decision making classifiers are not fair by default. Fairness requirements are an additional element to the decision making rationale, which is typically driven by maximizing some utility function. In that sense, algorithmic fairness…

In real-world elections where voters cast preference ballots, voters often provide only a partial ranking of the candidates. Despite this empirical reality, prior social choice literature frequently analyzes fairness criteria under the…