Related papers: Most Equitable Voting Rules
In the theory of voting, the Plurality rule for preferences that come in the form of linear orders selects the alternatives most frequently appearing in the first position of those orders, while the Anti-Plurality rule selects the…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…
We study diversity in approval-based committee elections with incomplete or inaccurate information. We define diversity according to the Maximum Coverage problem, which is known to be $\mathsf{NP}$-complete, with a best attainable…
We introduce a general problem about bribery in voting systems. In the $\mathcal{R}$-Multi-Bribery problem, the goal is to bribe a set of voters at minimum cost such that a desired candidate wins the perturbed election under the voting rule…
We study mechanism design problems in the {\em ordinal setting} wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents…
We consider a cooperative learning scenario where a collection of networked agents with individually owned classifiers dynamically update their predictions, for the same classification task, through communication or observations of each…
Given a connected graph on whose edges we can build roads to connect the nodes, a number of agents hold possibly different perspectives on which edges should be selected by assigning different edge weights. Our task is to build a minimum…
Various measures can be used to estimate bias or unfairness in a predictor. Previous work has already established that some of these measures are incompatible with each other. Here we show that, when groups differ in prevalence of the…
Motivated by scenarios where data is used for diverse prediction tasks, we study whether fair representation can be used to guarantee fairness for unknown tasks and for multiple fairness notions simultaneously. We consider seven group…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability that was proposed by…
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting that models the assignment of papers to reviewers. A recurring issue in allocation problems is the compatibility of welfare/efficiency and fairness. Given an oracle to find a…
Current fairness metrics and mitigation techniques provide tools for practitioners to asses how non-discriminatory Automatic Decision Making (ADM) systems are. What if I, as an individual facing a decision taken by an ADM system, would like…
This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…
The two standard fairness notions in the resource allocation literature are proportionality and envy-freeness. If there are n agents competing for the available resources, then proportionality requires that each agent receives at least a…
In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle.…
We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences…
The restricted max-min fair allocation problem seeks an allocation of resources to players that maximizes the minimum total value obtained by any player. It is NP-hard to approximate the problem to a ratio less than 2. Comparing the current…
Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…
We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination under the Monroe and Chamberlin--Courant multiwinner voting rules, which determine the set of representatives by optimizing the total (dis)satisfaction of the voters with their…