Related papers: A Single-Adversary-Single-Detector Zero-Sum Game i…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement against an adversary in uncertain networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic method to address the problem of optimal detector placement in a networked control system under cyber-attacks. The networked control system is composed of interconnected agents where each agent is…

This paper studies the sensor placement problem in a networked control system for improving its security against cyber-physical attacks. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game between an attacker and a detector. The attacker's…

We consider a two-player network inspection game, in which a defender allocates sensors with potentially heterogeneous detection capabilities in order to detect multiple attacks caused by a strategic attacker. The objective of the defender…

We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network that is comprised on components that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors to monitor…

We study the problem of sensor scheduling for an intrusion detection task. We model this as a two-player zero-sum game over a graph, where the defender (Player 1) seeks to identify the optimal strategy for scheduling sensor orientations to…

In the contemporary digital landscape, cybersecurity has become a critical issue due to the increasing frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks. This study utilizes a non-zero-sum game theoretical framework to model the strategic…

We consider a zero-sum inspection game, in which a defender positions detectors across a critical system to detect multiple attacks caused by an attacker. We assume that detection is imperfect, and each detector location is associated with…

Motivated by the controller placement problems in software-defined networks and the fair division principles of classical "cake cutting", we investigate the following two-player zero-sum game. In our model, a defender places a limited…

Motivated by authentication, intrusion and spam detection applications we consider single-class classification (SCC) as a two-person game between the learner and an adversary. In this game the learner has a sample from a target distribution…

This article studies a problem of strategic network inspection, in which a defender (agency) is tasked with detecting the presence of multiple attacks in the network. An inspection strategy entails monitoring the network components,…

Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…

Selecting the combination of security controls that will most effectively protect a system's assets is a difficult task. If the wrong controls are selected, the system may be left vulnerable to cyber-attacks that can impact the…

This paper considers the problem of security allocation in a networked control system under stealthy attacks. The system is comprised of interconnected subsystems represented by vertices. A malicious adversary selects a single vertex on…

This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…

When securing complex infrastructures or large environments, constant surveillance of every area is not affordable. To cope with this issue, a common countermeasure is the usage of cheap but wide-ranged sensors, able to detect suspicious…

We consider the design of a fair sensor schedule for a number of sensors monitoring different linear time-invariant processes. The largest average remote estimation error among all processes is to be minimized. We first consider a general…

We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…

We consider correlated equilibria in strategic games in an adversarial environment, where an adversary can compromise the public signal used by the players for choosing their strategies, while players aim at detecting a potential attack as…

We introduce a game of trusted computation in which a sensor equipped with limited computing power leverages a central node to evaluate a specified function over a large dataset, collected over time. We assume that the central computer can…