Related papers: On local uniqueness of normalized Nash equilibria
In this work, we present a novel characterization of approximate Nash equilibria in a class of convex games over the simplex. To achieve this, we regularize the utility functions using the Shannon entropy term, connect the solutions to the…
The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…
The generalized Nash equilibrium problems play a significant role in modeling and analyzing several complex economics problems. In this work, we consider jointly convex generalized Nash games which were introduced by Rosen. We study two…
Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is fundamental for practical applications where multiple self-interested agents work together to make optimal decisions. In this work, we study GNEP with shared distributionally robust chance…
We introduce a new algorithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria of competitive two-player games. Our method is a natural generalization of gradient descent to the two-player setting where the update is given by the Nash…
We prove an existence result for the time-dependent generalized Nash equilibrium problem under generalized convexity using a fixed point theorem. Furthermore, an application to the dynamic abstract economy is considered.
The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a kind of game to find strategies for a group of players such that each player's objective function is optimized. Solutions for GNEPs are called generalized Nash equilibria (GNEs). In this…
In Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), a population reaches a Nash equilibrium when none of the agents can improve its objective by solely changing its strategy on its own. Roughly speaking, this equilibrium is a protection against betrayal.…
This paper studies generalized Nash equilibrium problems that are given by rational functions. The optimization problems are not assumed to be convex. Rational expressions for Lagrange multipliers and feasible extensions of KKT points are…
This paper investigates full stability properties for \emph{variational Nash equilibriums} of a system of parametric nonconvex optimal control problems governed by semilinear elliptic partial differential equations. We first obtain some new…
A generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) in Banach space consists of $N>1$ optimal control problems with couplings in both the objective functions and, most importantly, in the feasible sets. We address the existence of equilibria for…
The equilibrium selection problem in the variational Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (v-GNEP) has been reported as an optimization problem defined over the solution set of v-GNEP, called in this paper the lower-level v-GNEP. However,…
We study generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games with quadratic costs and individual linear equality constraints. Departing from approaches that require strong monotonicity and/or shared constraints, we reformulate the KKT…
Zero-sum games arise in a wide variety of problems, including robust optimization and adversarial learning. However, algorithms deployed for finding a local Nash equilibrium in these games often converge to non-Nash stationary points. This…
In this note, we study a class of deterministic finite-horizon linear-quadratic difference games with coupled affine inequality constraints involving both state and control variables. We show that the necessary conditions for the existence…
In the present work we deal with set-valued equilibrium problems for which we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution. The conditions that we consider are imposed not on the whole domain, but rather on a self…
In this paper, we solve the problem of learning a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in merely monotone games. First, we propose a novel continuous semi-decentralized solution algorithm without projections that uses first-order information…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality are two distinct concepts when dealing with multiple criteria. It is well known that the two concepts do not coincide. However, in this work we show that it is possible to characterize the set of all…
In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain…