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A conceptually appealing approach for learning Extensive-Form Games (EFGs) is to convert them to Normal-Form Games (NFGs). This approach enables us to directly translate state-of-the-art techniques and analyses in NFGs to learning EFGs, but…

We introduce Cautious Optimism, a framework for substantially faster regularized learning in general games. Cautious Optimism, as a variant of Optimism, adaptively controls the learning pace in a dynamic, non-monotone manner to accelerate…

We study the problem of minimizing swap regret in structured normal-form games. Players have a very large (potentially infinite) number of pure actions, but each action has an embedding into $d$-dimensional space and payoffs are given by…

Most of the literature on learning in games has focused on the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Much less is known about the convergence of no-regret learning algorithms in dynamic multiagent…

This paper studies the optimistic variant of Fictitious Play for learning in two-player zero-sum games. While it is known that Optimistic FTRL -- a regularized algorithm with a bounded stepsize parameter -- obtains constant regret in this…

In two-player zero-sum games, if both players minimize their average external regret, then the average of the strategy profiles converges to a Nash equilibrium. For n-player general-sum games, however, theoretical guarantees for regret…

Regret minimization is a general approach to online optimization which plays a crucial role in many algorithms for approximating Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. The literature mainly focuses on solving individual games in…

Learning in games refers to scenarios where multiple players interact in a shared environment, each aiming to minimize their regret. An equilibrium can be computed at a fast rate of $O(1/T)$ when all players follow the optimistic…

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CRF) is a fundamental and effective technique for solving Imperfect Information Games (IIG). However, the original CRF algorithm only works for discrete state and action spaces, and the resulting strategy…

In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…

We study the problem of making predictions of an adversarially chosen high-dimensional state that are unbiased subject to an arbitrary collection of conditioning events, with the goal of tailoring these events to downstream decision makers.…

In many real-world scenarios, a team of agents coordinate with each other to compete against an opponent. The challenge of solving this type of game is that the team's joint action space grows exponentially with the number of agents, which…

We show that learning algorithms satisfying a $\textit{low approximate regret}$ property experience fast convergence to approximate optimality in a large class of repeated games. Our property, which simply requires that each learner has…

Incentive design is a popular framework for guiding agents' learning dynamics towards desired outcomes by providing additional payments beyond intrinsic rewards. However, most existing works focus on a finite, small set of agents or assume…

Understanding and predicting the behavior of large-scale multi-agents in games remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent systems. This paper examines the role of heterogeneity in equilibrium formation by analyzing how smooth…

We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar…

Motivated by learning of correlated equilibria in non-cooperative games, we perform a large deviations analysis of a regret minimizing stochastic approximation algorithm. The regret minimization algorithm we consider comprises multiple…

Online learning algorithms that minimize regret provide strong guarantees in situations that involve repeatedly making decisions in an uncertain environment, e.g. a driver deciding what route to drive to work every day. While regret…

Extensive-form games (EFGs) model finite sequential interactions between players. The amount of memory required to represent these games is the main bottleneck of algorithms for computing optimal strategies and the size of these strategies…