Related papers: EFX Allocations: Simplifications and Improvements
We here address the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods or chores to $n$ agents with weights that define their entitlement to the set of indivisible resources. Stemming from well-studied fairness concepts such as envy-freeness up…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to budget-constrained agents, aiming to provide fairness and efficiency guarantees. Specifically, our goal is to ensure that the resulting allocation is envy-free up to any item (EFx)…
We investigate the query complexity of the fair allocation of indivisible goods. For two agents with arbitrary monotonic utilities, we design an algorithm that computes an allocation satisfying envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), a…
We study fair division of goods under the broad class of generalized assignment constraints. In this constraint framework, the sizes and values of the goods are agent-specific, and one needs to allocate the goods among the agents fairly…
We study envy-free up to any item (EFX) allocations on simple graphs where vertices and edges represent agents and items respectively. An agent (vertex) is only interested in items (edges) that are incident to her and all other items always…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations, aiming for Best-of-Both-Worlds (BoBW) fairness: a distribution over allocations that is ex-ante fair, and additionally, it is supported…
Ensuring fairness while limiting costs, such as transportation or storage, is an important challenge in resource allocation, yet most work has focused on cost minimization without fairness or fairness without explicit cost considerations.…
We consider the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions and explore the connection between two prominent fairness notions: maximum Nash welfare (MNW) and envy-freeness up to any…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods between groups of agents using the recently introduced relaxations of envy-freeness. We consider the existence of fair allocations under different assumptions on the valuations of…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among additive agents with feasibility constraints. In these settings, every agent is restricted to get a bundle among a specified set of feasible bundles. Such scenarios have been of great…
We consider the complexity of finding envy-free allocations for the class of graphical valuations. Graphical valuations were introduced by Christodoulou et. al.(2023) as a structured class of valuations that admit allocations that are…
We study the problem of finding approximate envy-free allocations up to any $k$ goods ($\alpha$-EFkX), when agents have additive values over goods in a bundle. As our main result, we show that for any $k>2$, $\frac{k+1}{k+2}$-EFkX…
Fair allocation of indivisible goods studies allocating $m$ goods among $n$ agents in a fair manner. While fairness is a fundamental requirement in many real-world applications, it often conflicts with (economic) efficiency. This raises a…
We study the allocation of indivisible goods under conflicting constraints, represented by a graph. In this framework, vertices correspond to goods and edges correspond to conflicts between a pair of goods. Each agent is allocated an…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. We obtain novel approximation guarantees for three of the strongest fairness notions in discrete fair division, namely envy-free up to the removal of any…
For the fundamental problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible items among agents, envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and maximin fairness (MMS) are arguably the most compelling fairness concepts proposed until now. Unfortunately,…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents whose preferences include externalities. Unlike the standard fair division model, agents may derive positive or negative utility not only from items allocated…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods under cardinality constraints, where each agent must receive a bundle of fixed size. This models practical scenarios, such as assigning shifts or forming equally sized teams. Recently,…
Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequence of exchanges to attain fairness in the form of…