Related papers: The Limits of Limited Commitment

Equitably allocating limited resources in high-stakes domains-such as education, employment, and healthcare-requires balancing short-term utility with long-term impact, while accounting for delayed outcomes, hidden heterogeneity, and…

In this paper, we revisit the communication vs. distributed computing trade-off, studied within the framework of MapReduce in [1]. An implicit assumption in the aforementioned work is that each server performs all possible computations on…

Principal-agent problems arise when one party acts on behalf of another, leading to conflicts of interest. The economic literature has extensively studied principal-agent problems, and recent work has extended this to more complex scenarios…

Adaptive populations such as those in financial markets and distributed control can be modeled by the Minority Game. We consider how their dynamics depends on the agents' initial preferences of strategies, when the agents use linear or…

In this paper, we examine the fundamental performance limitations in the control of stochastic dynamical systems; more specifically, we derive generic $\mathcal{L}_p$ bounds that hold for any causal (stabilizing) controllers and any…

In this paper, we consider sequential dynamic team decision problems with nonclassical information structures. First, we address the problem from the point of view of a ``manager" who seeks to derive the optimal strategy of the team in a…

We study discrete-time discounted constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs) on Borel spaces with unbounded reward functions. In our approach the transition probability functions are weakly or set-wise continuous. The reward functions…

In this paper, we study contention resolution protocols from a game-theoretic perspective. We focus on \emph{acknowledgment-based} protocols, where a user gets feedback from the channel only when she attempts transmission. In this case she…

Many forecasting applications have a limited distributed target variable, which is zero for most observations and positive for the remaining observations. In the econometrics literature, there is much research about statistical model…

Estimation of individual treatment effects is commonly used as the basis for contextual decision making in fields such as healthcare, education, and economics. However, it is often sufficient for the decision maker to have estimates of…

We address the problem of learning to assign prediction tasks to one agent from a set of available human or AI agents. In particular, we focus on the sequential learning of agent expertise and assignment policies where each agent is…

Strategic classification studies learning in settings where self-interested users can strategically modify their features to obtain favorable predictive outcomes. A key working assumption, however, is that "favorable" always means…

Design optimizations in human-AI collaboration often focus on cognitive aspects like attention and task load. Drawing on work design literature, we propose that effective human-AI collaboration requires broader consideration of human needs…

We consider a class of submodular maximization problems in which decision-makers have limited access to the objective function. We explore scenarios where the decision-maker can observe only pairwise information, i.e., can evaluate the…

Information-theoretic bounded rationality describes utility-optimizing decision-makers whose limited information-processing capabilities are formalized by information constraints. One of the consequences of bounded rationality is that…

We study a model for cascade effects over finite networks based on a deterministic binary linear threshold model. Our starting point is a networked coordination game where each agent's payoff is the sum of the payoffs coming from pairwise…

This paper studies distributed optimal formation control with hard constraints on energy levels and termination time, in which the formation error is to be minimized jointly with the energy cost. The main contributions include a globally…

I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her…

Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…