Related papers: The Limits of Limited Commitment
Resource constraints can fundamentally change both learning and decision-making. We explore how memory constraints influence an agent's performance when navigating unknown environments using standard reinforcement learning algorithms.…
This paper shows how agents' choice in communicative action can be designed to mitigate the effect of their resource limits in the context of particular features of a collaborative planning task. I first motivate a number of hypotheses…
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…
This paper is concerned with a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-$\sigma$-algebra of that available to the leader. Such kind of…
Multi-unit organizations are a form of organizations where the geographically dispersed units provide similar products or services in different markets. Deciding on an appropriate level of centralization in such organizations presents a…
We derive a trade-off relation between the accuracy of implementing a desired unitary evolution using a restricted set of free unitaries and the size of the assisting system, in terms of the resource generating/losing capacity of the target…
We consider a bilevel continuous knapsack problem where the leader controls the capacity of the knapsack, while the follower chooses a feasible packing maximizing his own profit. The leader's aim is to optimize a linear objective function…
Assignment markets involve matching with transfers, as in labor markets and housing markets. We consider a two-sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure similar to models used in empirical studies, and characterize…
We consider the Bilevel Knapsack with Interdiction Constraints, an extension of the classic 0-1 knapsack problem formulated as a Stackelberg game with two agents, a leader and a follower, that choose items from a common set and hold their…
As LLMs increasingly act as autonomous agents in interactive and multi-agent settings, understanding their strategic behavior is critical for safety, coordination, and AI-driven social and economic systems. We investigate how payoff…
A greedy personality is usually accompanied by arrogance and confidence. This work investigates the cooperation success condition in the context of biased payoff allocation and self-confidence. The first component allows the organizer in a…
Complex engineered systems require coordinated design choices across heterogeneous components under multiple conflicting objectives and uncertain specifications. Monotone co-design provides a compositional framework for such problems by…
In this paper, we consider a hierarchical control problem with model uncertainty. Specifically, we consider the following objectives that we would like to accomplish. The first one being of a controllability-type that consists of…
I consider decision-making constrained by considerations of morality, rationality, or other virtues. The decision maker (DM) has a true preference over outcomes, but feels compelled to choose among outcomes that are top-ranked by some…
Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…
We integrate information-theoretic concepts into the design and analysis of optimistic algorithms and Thompson sampling. By making a connection between information-theoretic quantities and confidence bounds, we obtain results that relate…
We consider a discrete-time Markov decision process with Borel state and action spaces. The performance criterion is to maximize a total expected {utility determined by unbounded return function. It is shown the existence of optimal…
We study the problem of decision-making in the setting of a scarcity of shared resources when the preferences of agents are unknown a priori and must be learned from data. Taking the two-sided matching market as a running example, we focus…
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of…
Most decision theories, including expected utility theory, rank dependent utility theory and cumulative prospect theory, assume that investors are only interested in the distribution of returns and not in the states of the economy in which…