Related papers: Prophet Inequality on I.I.D. Distributions: Beatin…
In our problem, we are given access to a number of sequences of nonnegative i.i.d. random variables, whose realizations are observed sequentially. All sequences are of the same finite length. The goal is to pick one element from each…
We consider prophet inequalities in a setting where agents correspond to both elements in a matroid and vertices in a graph. A set of agents is feasible if they form both an independent set in the matroid and an independent set in the…
We study generalizations of the "Prophet Inequality" and "Secretary Problem", where the algorithm is restricted to an arbitrary downward-closed set system. For {0,1}-values, we give O(log n)-competitive algorithms for both problems. This is…
The value maximization version of the secretary problem is the problem of hiring a candidate with the largest value from a randomly ordered sequence of candidates. In this work, we consider a setting where predictions of candidate values…
We consider the problem of online allocation (matching, budgeted allocations, and assortments) of reusable resources where an adversarial sequence of resource requests is revealed over time and any allocated resource is used/rented for a…
We study the online stochastic bipartite matching problem, in a form motivated by display ad allocation on the Internet. In the online, but adversarial case, the celebrated result of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani gives an approximation ratio…
We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by constructing price-based online approximation algorithms, a natural…
We study variants of the secretary problem, where $N$, the number of candidates, is a random variable, and the decision maker wants to maximize the probability of success -- picking the largest number among the $N$ candidates -- using only…
We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valuations are provided as inputs to the algorithm. In this…
In this paper, we study twelve stochastic input models for online problems and reveal the relationships among the competitive ratios for the models. The competitive ratio is defined as the worst ratio between the expected optimal value and…
Due to their numerous applications, in particular in Mechanism Design, Prophet Inequalities have experienced a surge of interest. They describe competitive ratios for basic stopping time problems where random variables get revealed…
Online matching has received significant attention over the last 15 years due to its close connection to Internet advertising. As the seminal work of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani has an optimal (1 - 1/e) competitive ratio in the standard…
Online Bipartite Matching with random user arrival is a fundamental problem in the online advertisement ecosystem. Over the last 30 years, many algorithms and impossibility results have been developed for this problem. In particular, the…
We investigate prophet inequalities with competitive ratios approaching $1$, seeking to generalize $k$-uniform matroids. We first show that large girth does not suffice: for all $k$, there exists a matroid of girth $\geq k$ and a prophet…
There are two major models of value uncertainty in the optimal stopping literature: the secretary model, which assumes no prior knowledge, and the prophet inequality model, which assumes full information about value distributions. In…
We provide prophet inequality algorithms for online weighted matching in general (non-bipartite) graphs, under two well-studied arrival models, namely edge arrival and vertex arrival. The weight of each edge is drawn independently from an…
A variant of the online knapsack problem is considered in the settings of trusted and untrusted predictions. In Unit Profit Knapsack, the items have unit profit, and it is easy to find an optimal solution offline: Pack as many of the…
Consider the problem: we are given $n$ boxes, labeled $\{1,2,\ldots, n\}$ by an adversary, each containing a single number chosen from an unknown distribution; these $n$ distributions are not necessarily identical. We are also given an…
We study the classic divide-and-choose method for equitably allocating divisible goods between two players who are rational, self-interested Bayesian agents. The players have additive values for the goods. The prior distributions on those…
An unknown positive number of items arrive at independent uniformly distributed times in the interval [0,1] to a selector, whose task is to pick online the last one. We show that under the assumption of an adversary determining the number…