Related papers: Stable Outcomes and Information in Games: An Empir…
We extend the concept of meta-Nash equilibrium, introduced by Eshaghi Gordji and Bagha [2026] for complete-information games, to environments with incomplete information. We define a meta-Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a profile of…
$S$ equilibrium synthesizes a century of game-theoretic modeling. $S$-beliefs determine choices as in the refinement literature and level-$k$, without anchoring on Nash equilibrium or imposing ad hoc belief formation. $S$-choices allow for…
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…
This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…
This work contains the mathematical exploration of a few prototypical games in which central concepts from statistics and probability theory naturally emerge. The first two kinds of games are termed Fisher and Bayesian games, which are…
A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered, and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite actions spaces, bounded…
We consider an environment where players need to decide whether to buy a certain product (or adopt a technology) or not. The product is either good or bad, but its true value is unknown to the players. Instead, each player has her own…
Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing…
When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions…
We consider a class of two-player dynamic stochastic nonzero-sum games where the state transition and observation equations are linear, and the primitive random variables are Gaussian. Each controller acquires possibly different dynamic…
The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some…
This paper introduces risk-revising players to a class of games with incomplete information. These players enter the game with ex ante risk preferences represented by coherent risk measures and develop time-consistent interim revisions of…
The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner's Dilemmas…
Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…
In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…
We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study structured perfect Bayesian equilibria…
We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in…
While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…
A fundamental problem in noncooperative dynamic game theory is the computation of Nash equilibria under different information structures, which specify the information available to each agent during decision-making. Prior work has…