Related papers: Cooperation in costly-access environments
Cooperation lies at the foundations of human societies, yet why people cooperate remains a conundrum. The issue, known as network reciprocity, of whether population structure can foster cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has been…
We explore the minimal conditions for sustainable cooperation on a spatially distributed population of memoryless, unconditional strategies (cooperators and defectors) in presence of unbiased, non contingent mobility in the context of the…
Recent empirical studies suggest that heavy-tailed distributions of human activities are universal in real social dynamics [Muchnik, \emph{et al.}, Sci. Rep. \textbf{3}, 1783 (2013)]. On the other hand, community structure is ubiquitous in…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice.…
Introducing strategy complexity into the basic conflict of cooperation and defection is a natural response to avoid the tragedy of the common state. As an intermediate approach, quasi-cooperators were recently suggested to address the…
We examine the impact of the maintenance cost of social links on cooperative behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Barab\'asi-Albert scale-free network with a pairwise stochastic imitation. We show by means of Monte Carlo…
We study a spatial two-strategy (cooperation and defection) Prisoner's Dilemma game with two types ($A$ and $B$) of players located on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by iterated strategy…
This paper studies a preference evolution model in which a population of agents are matched to play a sequential prisoner's dilemma in an incomplete information environment. An institution can design an incentive-compatible screening…
Gallice and Monzon (2019) present a natural environment that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. They demonstrate that in a sequential public goods game, where agents lack…
Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is beneficial for all competitors. To explore the possible…
Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation.…
We study a spatial, one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) model in which selection operates on both an organism's behavioral strategy (cooperate or defect) and its choice of when to implement that strategy across a set of discrete time slots.…
The spatial arrangement of individuals is thought to overcome the dilemma of cooperation: When cooperators engage in clusters they might share the benefit of cooperation while being more protected against non-cooperating individuals, which…
The Prisoner's dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in…
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. These mechanisms include assortative or networked…
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower…
We show that in a situation where individuals have a choice between a costly institute and a free institute to perform a collective action task, the existence of a participation cost promotes cooperation in the costly institute. Despite…
The theoretical description of the evolution of cooperation presented by Bergstrom based on assortative matching with partner choice allows to model the population dynamics in a game of Nonrepetitive Prisoners Dilemma. In this paper we…
Cooperation is usually represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Although individual self-interest may not favour cooperation, cooperation can evolve if, for example, players interact multiple times adjusting their behaviour accordingly to…